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PROTECTING THE DIGNITY AND EQUALITY OF 
CHILDREN: THE IMPORTANCE OF INTEGRATED 
SCHOOLS
by SHARON E. RUSH?
“[U]nless our children begin to learn together, there is little hope that 
our people will ever learn to live together.”1
 —Justice Thurgood Marshall 
INTRODUCTION
“From the birth of the common school movement through early 
desegregation cases, schools were seen not simply as places where 
students learned how to read and write but also as places where they 
learned how to become better citizens.”2
 —Professor James Ryan 
Historically, most white people in the United States believed in the race myth: 
that they were superior to people of other colors.3 Although only a myth, this belief 
operated in a real way as if it were the truth. It enabled both the federal and state 
governments to establish legal regimes that officially denied the humanity, 
including the dignity and equality, of everyone who was not white, a group 
commonly referred to as “people of color.”4 It also is worth emphasizing, however, 
? Irving Cypen Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I want to thank the 
participants at the International Conference on Law held in Athens, Greece July 18-21, 2010 and 
sponsored by the Athens Institute for Research and Education for their support of the ideas in this paper. 
I also am deeply grateful to the Irving Cypen family and Dean Robert Jerry for their generous support of 
my research. Finally, a heartfelt “thank you” to Audra Price, the Editor-in-Chief, and to all of the 
Temple Law students whose work editing this Article immeasurably enhanced its quality. 
1. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 783 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
2. James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 HARV. L. REV. 131, 143 
(2007) (footnotes omitted). 
3. See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS
OF AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 9-10 (1996) (“[T]he precept of inferiority . . . posed as an article of faith 
that African Americans were not quite altogether human.”). 
4. People of color have shown remarkable resistance to persistent inequality. See Thomas E.
Kleven, Brown’s Lesson: To Integrate or Separate Is Not the Question, But How to Achieve a Non-
Racist Society, 5 U. MD. L. J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 43, 43 (2005) (“Yet, African 
Americans coped with enforced segregation, maintaining strong family ties and group solidarity. Some 
thrived within the black community, and a few achieved success in the greater society, while continuing 
to endure the indignities of racism.”) (footnotes omitted). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1822273
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that all people, including white people, have a racial color. Nevertheless, the phrase 
is helpful to depict the power dichotomy reflective of the race myth and will be 
used in this Article. In the United States, the myth’s most heinous validation was 
found in the institution of slavery, followed by de jure segregation. 
Eventually, the government would officially abolish slavery and rule de jure
segregation in public schools unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka.5 Yet debunking the myth continues to be a challenge. This Article posits 
that one explanation for the persistence of the myth is the legal sanctioning and 
social acceptance of racially identifiable6 public schools across the nation,7
notwithstanding Brown’s mandate to integrate the schools.8 The acceptance of such 
systems, particularly given the economic inequality built into them,9 perpetuates 
the race myth. Only a belief in the inferiority of students of color can justify the 
persistent legal and social acceptance of providing them with inferior (less 
resource-rich) educations. But the corollary is also true and almost always ignored: 
only a belief in the superiority of white students can justify the persistent legal and 
social insistence that they be provided with superior (more resource-rich) 
educations.10
 5. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 6. A “racially identifiable” school is one that reinforces the race myth because it lacks “unitary 
status” or “racial diversity.” These terms, as well as others, are not amenable to exact definition, but they 
describe meaningful concepts in the area of school integration. One purpose of this Article is to explore 
how such concepts relate to each other in the struggle to achieve racial equality. Ironically, even the 
term “racial equality” defies exact definition, but it also is richly meaningful and significant in a 
democracy. 
7. See generally GARY ORFIELD, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, REVIVING THE GOAL OF AN 
INTEGRATED SOCIETY: A 21ST CENTURY CHALLENGE (Jan. 2009), available at http://civilrightsproject. 
ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/reviving-the-goal-of-an-integrated-society-a-
21st-century-challenge/orfield-reviving-the-goal-mlk-2009.pdf (detailing the causes and effects of 
increasingly segregated public schools in the last few decades). For a critical analysis of this 
development, see Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., All Deliberate Speed?: Brown’s Past and Brown’s Future,
107 W. VA. L. REV. 625, 631 (2005). For recent statistics on the phenomenon that society is becoming 
more segregated even as it becomes more diverse, see Goodwin Liu, Seattle and Louisville, 95 CALIF. L.
REV. 277, 277-78 (2007). 
 8. People disagree on the core meaning of Brown. For example, Professor Molly McUsic argues 
that one main principle of Brown is that children are entitled to equal educational opportunities. She 
suggests that “[i]ntegration, albeit integration by economic class, is the most effective, least expensive 
way to provide a quality education to all children.” Molly S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of 
Education: Economic Integration of the Public Schools, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1334, 1335 (2004). Other 
prominent scholars agree, however, that Brown was interpreted to direct schools to racially integrate; 
this was eventually articulated by the Court in Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968). 
Perhaps Professor Spann says it best: “Whatever Brown and the Equal Protection Clause ultimately 
mean, they cannot mean that it is now okay to resegregate our schools in a way that may be the 
harbinger of an even more general resegregation of our society.” Girardeau A. Spann, The Conscience of 
a Court, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 431, 469 (2009). 
9. See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (rev. ed. 2004) (discussing the economic 
inequality inherent in the legal sanctioning of de facto segregated public schools post-Brown).
 10. This is articulated most forcefully by Professor Spann, supra note 8, at 447-48, critiquing the 
Court in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007): 
The Supreme Court chose to give the seats to the white students, thereby sacrificing the 
inclusionary interest of minority students in an integrated education to the exclusionary 
convenience interests of white parents. Moreover, because white parents knew that 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1822273
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The primary goal of this Article is to promote the urgency of the need to 
invalidate the race myth and to suggest that integrated schools are the best, and 
perhaps the only way to stop sending a message that white children deserve to be 
educated in schools richer in resources than those attended by minority student 
populations. This powerfully indoctrinates white children into believing in the myth 
of white superiority even as society, including white society, officially eschews the 
myth of black inferiority. 
For decades since Brown, many equality-minded people and the Supreme 
Court have premised their efforts to integrate public schools on the democratic 
belief that integrated schools help children—all children—become better citizens.11
This premise derives from Brown itself, because Brown established the 
constitutional principle that children of color are equal human beings to white 
children and all children are constitutionally entitled to have their dignity and 
equality protected.12 Brown’s holding that “[s]eparate educational facilities are 
inherently unequal”13 is indelibly etched in the minds of many equality-minded 
Americans.14
To legally establish the obvious, that people of color are human beings and
that white people are not a superior class of human beings, Brown and its progeny 
understood the necessity of invalidating the race myth. Public school integration 
was a means to achieve this democratic end.15 Through day-to-day interactions 
across the color line, children are better able to learn the complexities of race and 
race relationships and more likely to see the fallacy of the myth. Integration of the 
schools was, and continues to be, an instrumental way to teach children, 
particularly white children, to respect and protect each other’s human dignity. 
resegregation would be the result of overriding the integration plans that they sought to 
invalidate, the “convenience” interest of disappointed white parents ended up actually being 
an interest in renewed racial segregation. 
Id.
11. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330-32 (2003) (discussing the importance of diversity, 
and by extension integration, in creating the most productive classroom for student development). 
12. See Brown, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (holding that segregation deprives children of color of equal 
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment). 
13. Id.
 14. Unlike this Article, some scholars distinguish between voluntarily and involuntarily segregated 
schools and suggest that voluntarily segregated schools can promote the best interests of students of 
color. See Kleven, supra note 4, at 51 (“[T]he forced separation of the races is inherently unequal 
because it is imposed by whites as a means of maintaining white supremacy.”). But see James Marvin 
Perez, Book Note: Brown’s Demise, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 712, 718 (2005) (reviewing CHARLES J.
OGLETREE, Jr., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION (2004)) (arguing that “even voluntarily segregated schools . . . would be deemed 
inferior, regardless of whether African Americans obtain an equal education or not.”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 15. Initially, the Court used the word “desegregation” and not “integration” to remedy the problem 
of de jure segregation. This helps explain why the de jure/de facto distinction has become central to 
evaluation of the constitutionality of race-conscious policies affecting public schools. See Lino A. 
Graglia, Solving the Parents Involved Paradox, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 911, 921 (2008) (“The 
fraudulence of the de jure—de facto distinction that made the move from prohibiting to requiring race 
discrimination possible also makes possible a return to the prohibition by simply treating the distinction 
as valid.”) (emphasis in original). Regardless of Brown’s use of “desegregation,” its mandate was to 
integrate the schools. 
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Although dignity is not explicitly mentioned or protected in the Constitution, 
Brown’s and its progeny’s mandate to integrate the public schools signify the 
importance of human dignity in a democracy’s struggle to achieve racial justice. 
Over the years, this core understanding of Brown has been misunderstood and 
all but forgotten. This undoubtedly reflects how hard and frustrating the struggle 
has been to achieve Brown’s goal in light of the massive resistance to public school 
integration.16 Understandably, equality-minded people invoke Brown to argue for 
equalizing school resources—even as the schools remain racially identifiable.17
They also rely on Brown to argue that something needs to be done to equalize the 
achievement outcomes between children of color and white children, who attend 
racially identifiable schools.18 Without a doubt, economic equality and 
achievement equality are related,19 and both are vital concerns in the struggle to 
achieve overall human equality. Brown can and should be invoked to support those 
efforts. But those aspects of the struggle for racial equality should be used to 
bolster and not detract from, or even abandon,20 the main message of Brown about 
hum
ignity by invalidating the myth of black inferiority and white 
supe
an equality. 
As important as it is to continue to fight for economic and achievement 
equality,21 and as frustrating as the struggle has been to achieve those goals in 
racially identifiable schools, this Article posits that unless the race myth is 
debunked, especially the myth of white superiority, even efforts to achieve 
economic and achievement equality in public education will be (and have proven to 
be) largely fruitless. This Article urges equality-minded people to stay the course 
on trying to understand and achieve Brown’s core lesson: integrated schools protect 
children’s d
riority.
Dishearteningly, the Court’s 2007 decision in Parents Involved in Community 
16. See infra Part II.A.2 (detailing the resistance to enforcement of Brown).
17. See, e.g., Eboni S. Nelson, Examining the Costs of Diversity, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 577 
(2009) (advocating that school officials focus less on achieving diversity and more on improving the 
u
 that effective schools for blacks must be a primary goal 
t
mic factors out of the control of 
t embrace and improve racially concentrated schools, rather than 
e
e myth of white 
y are trying hard to guard against the myth of black inferiority. 
q ality of education in racially identifiable schools). 
18. See, e.g., Dora W. Klein, Beyond Brown v. Board of Education: The Need to Remedy the 
Achievement Gap, 31 J. L. & EDUC. 431, 456-57 (2002) (“Most desegregation cases decided under 
Brown, however, are incapable of addressing the disparities that exist between the academic 
achievement of black and white students. Thus, only one of the problems identified in Brown—
segregation (but not inequality)—is likely to be remedied . . . .”); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of 
Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 532-33 (1980) (“But 
successful magnet schools may provide a lesson
ra her than a secondary result of integration.”). 
19. See generally Klein, supra note 18, at 434 (recognizing econo
school districts which inherently affect achievement). 
20. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 17, at 584 (“[U]rg[ing] school officials to . . . craft and implement 
creative and effective initiatives tha
m rely seeking to diversify them.”). 
21. Id. at 622 (arguing that embracing “minority-concentrated schools” is critical to fight against the 
“message of inherent inferiority that the closing of black schools conveyed not only to the black 
community but also to the country”). This effort is important, but the heart of the problem is the 
continuing validation of the race myth by white society. When people of color voluntarily segregate or 
abandon efforts for integration, they run the risk of inadvertently reinforcing th
superiority, even as the
Fall 2010] DIGNITY AND EQUALITY OF CHILDREN 75
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,22 knocked the wind, yet again, out of the 
sails of equality-minded people who continue to believe in Brown’s core message. 
In Parents Involved, the Court held that public school officials who want to achieve 
racial diversity in their K-12 schools are only allowed to consider the race of 
prospective students in making individual school assignments if they can meet the 
strict scrutiny standard.23 To meet strict scrutiny, school officials must demonstrate 
that the use of such classifications is “narrowly tailored” to achieve a “compelling 
government interest.”24 The continuing existence of racially identifiable schools in 
light of Parents Involved provides an excellent opportunity to reaffirm the meaning 
of the concept of equality in the context of Brown. To emphasize, Brown was 
concerned about protecting human equality, and this required the Court to protect 
the d
er school integration27 because integration is the only way to 
reno
ignity and equality of all children.25
An analysis of the United States’ journey to achieve racial equality must 
center on the importance of school integration. It provides an opportunity to 
examine what integration means and why it continues to be essential to dispel the 
race myth. Part I of this Article explores several pre-Brown cases where the Court 
laid a foundation for understanding how segregation violates human dignity. 
Initially the Court erroneously presumed that segregation violated only the dignity 
and equality of people of color and that it had no relationship to or affect on the 
dignity and equality of white people.26 As Part II demonstrates, these erroneous 
presumptions have yet to be corrected—even as post-Brown decisions including 
Parents Involved repeatedly acknowledged that segregation violates the dignity and 
equality of people of color. Part II also illustrates that Brown and its progeny 
reinforced the importance of integration by protecting the values of dignity and 
equality. It does so by exploring alternative legal paths the Court could have taken 
that would not have protected those values. The Court chose to strike down de jure
segregation and ord
unce the myth. 
Finally, the damage caused by the Court’s persistent failure to acknowledge 
that segregation violates the dignity of all children, including white children, is 
exacerbated and perpetuated in Parents Involved. Part III examines how that case 
dissociates the values of dignity and equality from school integration—even as 
those values relate to children of color. Because “[s]eparate . . . [is] inherently 
unequal,”28 Part III emphasizes how integration continues to be essential in the 
 22. 551 U.S. 701. 
23. Id. at 720. 
24. Id.
25. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (holding that because “separate educational facilities are inherently 
unequal,” they violate the Equal Protection Clause). 
26. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (“[T]he underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s 
argument . . . [is] that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of 
inferiority. If this be so, it is . . . solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon 
it.”), overruled by Brown, 347 U.S. 483; Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (“To separate [children of color] from 
others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to 
their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be 
undone.”). 
27. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-96; Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka (“Brown II”), 349 U.S. 294 
(1955). 
28. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
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struggle to achieve racial equality. Integrated schools provide children with the 
opportunities to develop cross-racial understanding and finally reject the race myth. 
Given the importance of education to children, as acknowledged by the Court in 
Brown and later on,29 adults are obligated to teach the next generation the lessons it 
will need as tomorrow’s leaders in the ongoing movement to secure and protect the 
democratic values of dignity and equality. 
I. THE PATH TO BROWN’S MANDATE TO INTEGRATE THE SCHOOLS
ace Myth: The Underlying Premise Defining Race Relations Prior to 
Brow
ntended to establish and protect the citizenship rights of the newly freed 
slav
of color.35 Said the Court: “[I]f the enforced separation of the two races stamps the 
A. The R
n
Following the end of slavery, white society instituted the legal regime of de
jure segregation, the legally enforced separation of the races. In 1896, in Plessy v. 
Ferguson,30 the Court upheld the constitutionality of the “separate but equal” 
doctrine in public transportation.31 The case arose in the context of a state law that 
required railroads to maintain separate cars for whites and blacks.32 The significant 
constitutional question before the Court was whether the law violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws.33 The 
Fourteenth Amendment, of course, was ratified following the end of the Civil War 
and was i
es.34
Before equality-minded people even get to the question of the constitutionality 
of de jure segregation, they must ask why white society would want to segregate 
itself legally from people of other colors? There is only one answer: it believed in 
the validity of the race myth. But adherence to this belief also created dissonance in 
the minds of many equality-minded whites because it defied reality: people of all 
colors are human beings, and white people are not a superior class of human 
beings. White society tried to manage the dissonance by creating the “separate but 
equal” doctrine and by putting the burden of perpetuating racial injustice on people 
29. See id. at 493 (“Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments. . . . [I]t is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing 
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these 
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the 
opportunity of an education.”); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (“[E]ducation provides 
the basic tools by which individuals might lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us all. In 
bric of our society.”). 
y Brown, 347 U.S. 483. 
aled by 1972 La. Acts No. 262, §1. 
mendment] was to establish the citizenship of the negro can admit of no 
sum, education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fa
 30. 163 U.S. 537, overruled b
31. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552. 
 32. 1890 La. Acts No. 111, 152, repe
33. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 542-43. 
34. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 73 (1872) (“That [the] main purpose [of the first 
clause of the Fourteenth A
doubt.”). 
35. See D. Marvin Jones, Plessy’s Ghost: Grutter, Seattle and the Quiet Reversal of Brown, 35 
PEPP. L. REV. 583, 600-01 (2008) (“[T]he court was skeptical of whether the necessary causal link 
between race and disproportionate exclusion was present; instead, it could have been blacks’ own fault. . 
. . [The Court] also hints, in the spirit of Plessy, that the problem of blacks may be natural; maybe they 
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colored race with a badge of inferiority . . . it is not by reason of anything found in 
the [law], but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon 
it.”36
As long as white society believed that they and people of color could live 
separately and “equally,” then white society believed it could preserve its 
democratic image. White society also had an answer for people of color who 
rightfully challenged the humanity of the “separate but equal” doctrine: they could 
blame the people of color for having low self-esteem. As long as white society told 
itself that people of color were responsible for their continuing subordination 
following slavery, white society did not have to confront its own undemocratic 
legal regime.37 Stated alternatively, by “blaming the victims” for its own inhumane 
treatment of people of color, white society validated the race myth even as it 
pretended that the myth did not exist. 
Occasionally, however, white society got backed into the corner on the issue 
of racial equality and the only way out, for those who believed in a democratic 
society, was to modify the operation of the “separate but equal” doctrine. Two such 
occasions arose when Lloyd Gaines and Heman Marion Sweatt, aspiring black 
lawyers, had no law schools to accommodate them in a de jure segregated society 
that did not even believe in their humanity.38 Relying on the principle of equality, 
they knew their only hope to achieve their dreams was to challenge the whites-only 
admissions policies in the existing law schools.39 The Supreme Court’s response to 
their suits offers insights into the meaning and importance of integration in the 
struggle to protect human dignity and ultimately achieve racial equality. 
B. Early Pre-Brown Hints into the Meaning of Integration 
1. What Integration Does Not Mean 
In 1938 in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,40 the Court ordered Missouri to 
admit Gaines to its whites-only law school.41 At the time, there was no law school 
at all for blacks to attend.42 Missouri’s elementary and high schools were 
segregated pursuant to state law (de jure segregation) and Missouri’s courts 
interpreted its segregation laws to extend to colleges and professional schools. 
Relying on state law, Missouri offered to pay for Gaines to attend school out of 
would rather play basketball than be entrepreneurs.”). See also Sharon E. Rush, Sharing Space: Why 
Racial Goodwill Isn’t Enough, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1999) (exploring in-depth white society’s denial of 
racism). 
36. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551. 
37. See Jones, supra note 35, at 596 (“Of course, if whites are the naturally superior race, not only 
are whites absolved from moral responsibility—their superior position in society is inevitable—but also 
blacks are the cause for their own degradation. The fault is in their gene pool.”) (emphasis in original). 
 38. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
39. See Gaines, 305 U.S. at 342 (After graduating from Lincoln University with a Bachelor of Arts, 
Gaines applied to the University of Missouri Law School, as the all-black Lincoln University did not 
have a law school); Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 631 (At time when no Texas law schools admitted blacks, 
Sweatt was denied admission to the University of Texas Law School solely because he was black.). 
 40. 305 U.S. 337. 
41. Id. at 352. 
42. Id. at 345. 
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state, but the Court fought for his admission and held Missouri obligated to provide 
an equal education to blacks.43 If there was no separate school for blacks, then 
Missouri had to admit blacks to the white school.44
Admittedly, Gaines’ message about the relevance and importance of 
integration to the protection of dignity and the achievement of racial equality is, at 
best, ambiguous. On the one hand, Gaines is consistent with Plessy and the 
“separate but equal” doctrine. It was not the existence of an unequal school for 
blacks that resulted in the Court’s holding; rather, it was the total absence of a 
school blacks could attend.45 Because no separate school existed, even a separate 
but equal school, then the schools for whites had to be open to blacks as well.46
How the Court’s decision moves in the general direction of protecting dignity, 
however, is not obvious. 
But, from a different perspective, Gaines stands for the important message that 
Jim Crow laws did have constitutional limits.47 Put most poignantly, Gaines struck 
a blow, albeit not a huge one but nevertheless a significant one, to the validity of 
the race myth.48 Moreover, the absence of a black law school had nothing to do 
with anything blacks brought upon themselves—notwithstanding Plessy’s 
insistence that blacks had only themselves to blame if they felt unequal to whites.49
This was white society’s constitutional violation that resulted from the real way it 
treated blacks, and white society was constitutionally obligated to remedy the harm 
by admitting Gaines to the white law school.50
The Court reaffirmed the Gaines principle in the famous 1950 case of Sweatt 
v. Painter.51 Sweatt also aspired to be a lawyer, but Texas did not have a law 
school for blacks.52 When he challenged the whites-only admissions policy at the 
43. Id. at 342-43, 351-52. 
44. See id. at 351-52 (“[T]he State was bound to furnish [Gaines] within its borders facilities for 
legal education substantially equal to those which the State there afforded for persons of the white race . 
. . . [Gaines] was entitled to be admitted to the law school of the State University . . . .”). 
45. See id. at 352 (“[P]etitioner was entitled to be admitted to the law school of the State University 
in the absence of other and proper provision for his legal training within the State.”) (emphasis added). 
46. Gaines, 305 U.S. at 351-52. 
47. See Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 673, 701 (1992) (“[T]he 
constitutional violation must stem from the frustration of Gaines’ subjective desire to attend the in-state 
school. . . . Gaines was entitled to an equal right to vindicate this personal desire even if it was shared by 
no other member of his race.”); see also John Hasnas, Equal Opportunity, Affirmative Action, and the 
Anti-Discrimination Principle: The Philosophical Basis for the Legal Prohibition of Discrimination, 71 
FORDHAM L. REV. 423, 462 (2002) (“In Gaines, the Court . . . completed the conversion of the doctrine 
of separate but equal from Jim Crow’s shield to a sword at his throat.”). 
48. See Mary Ann Connell, Race and Higher Education: The Tortuous Journey Toward 
Desegregation, 36 J.C. & U.L. 945, 948 (2010) (“While Gaines did little more than emphasize the 
‘equal’ in the separate-but-equal doctrine, the case was immensely important as a symbol of support of 
the rights of black citizens and of the Supreme Court’s intention to uphold those rights.”). 
49. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551 (Stating that if the “enforced separation of the two races stamps the 
colored race with a badge of inferiority . . . . it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely 
because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.”). 
50. See Gaines, 305 U.S. at 350 (“[T]he obligation of the State [is] to give the protection of equal 
laws . . . within its own jurisdiction . . . . That obligation is imposed by the Constitution upon the States . 
. . . [I]t [is] the constitutional duty of Missouri when it supplied [legal education] courses for white 
students to make equivalent provision for negroes.”). 
 51. 339 U.S. 629. 
52. Id. at 631. The lower court continued Sweatt’s case for six months to give Texas time to 
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University of Texas, Texas quickly adopted plans to create a law school for blacks 
so that the University would not have to admit Sweatt or other blacks.53 Under 
Plessy, of course, blacks were entitled to attend an equal, albeit separate, school.54
The Court acknowledged that the University of Texas Law School “may properly 
be considered one of the nation’s ranking law schools.”55 In comparison, plans for 
the law school for blacks did not even provide for an “independent faculty or 
library.”56 In short, Sweatt argued that the imagined law school for blacks, even 
upon completion, would not come close to satisfying the equality requirement of 
the “separate but equal” doctrine.57 The Court unanimously agreed and Sweatt was 
offered admission to the University of Texas.58
Within months of his Supreme Court victory, Gaines mysteriously 
disappeared and never enrolled in the newly constructed Lincoln Law School 
established for blacks after the Gaines ruling.59 Sweatt’s lawsuit left him 
“emotionally and physically exhausted.”60 He had his appendix removed during his 
first year of school and missed several weeks of classes before deciding to give up 
the pursuit of law.61
Regardless of the fact that neither Gaines nor Sweatt earned his law degree, 
their cases remain landmark decisions along the equality path because they provide 
hints into the relationship between the democratic values of equality and dignity, 
and the role integration plays in protecting them. Their cases do this by the 
intriguing questions they raise. Specifically, if Gaines had enrolled at the 
University of Missouri, would he have “integrated” Missouri’s segregated law 
school? It is tempting to think that he would have integrated the school because of 
his presence in an otherwise all-white school. Yet the dictionary defines 
“integration” as “the intermixing of people or groups previously segregated.”62
This definition suggests that it is a stretch to say that one black student could 
integrate a whole school of white students. But Sweatt and the “handful” of other 
blacks at the University of Texas raise the same concern. How many students of a 
different race would it take to integrate a school? Common sense calls for a more 
meaningful understanding of integration. Another pre-Brown case, McLaurin v. 
establish a law school for blacks. Id. at 632. 
53. Id. at 632. 
54. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550-51. 
55. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 633. 
56. Id.
57. See id. at 634 (“[T]he University of Texas Law School possesses to a far greater degree those 
qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school. 
Such qualities, to name but a few, include reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration, 
position and influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and prestige.”). 
58. Id. at 636. 
 59. Chad Garrison, The Mystery of Lloyd Gaines, RIVERFRONT TIMES (Apr. 4, 2007), http://www. 
riverfronttimes.com/2007-04-04/news/the-mystery-of-lloyd-gaines/. 
 60. NAT’L BAR ASS’N, 26TH ANNUAL MID-YEAR CONFERENCE PROGRAM, HEMAN MARION 
SWEATT AWARDS LUNCHEON, 3 (Apr. 28, 2006), available at http://nationalbar.org/pdf/NBALuncheon 
ProgramFinal06.pdf. 
61. Id. Eventually, Sweatt earned a master’s degree in the field of community organizations from 
the Atlanta University Graduate School of Social Work and became the assistant director of the National 
Urban League’s southern regional office. Id.
 62. THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 882 (1st ed. 2001). 
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Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education,63 sheds some light on this question 
of what it means for a school to be integrated. 
George McLaurin challenged the constitutionality of Oklahoma’s laws that 
prohibited him, on account of his race, from pursuing a master’s degree in 
education at the University of Oklahoma.64 A lower federal court held the laws 
unconstitutional. In response, the Oklahoma legislature amended its laws to allow 
McLaurin to attend the University.65 Again, it might be tempting to say that his 
solitary presence as the only black student in the entire school integrated the 
university. Even if one were to bite at this temptation, one must also be aware of 
what happened to him once he was physically present within the school. 
Astoundingly, the amended laws also required that McLaurin be segregated from 
his white classmates within the school.66 Specifically, he was prohibited by law 
from going into certain places and rooms in the university. He listened to lectures 
on the mezzanine outside the lecture hall and ate at a separate time in the 
lunchroom.67 He was isolated, in every respect, from his white classmates. Thus, in 
reality or even according to the dictionary, McLaurin did not integrate the 
University of Oklahoma. 
Thus far, Gaines, Sweatt, and McLaurin help to elucidate what integration is 
not. Integration is not the presence of one or even a handful of racial minority 
students in an otherwise all white school. Nor is integration achieved when students 
of different races are isolated from each other within the same school. That is 
simply intra-school segregation.68
Yet, in the culture of “separate but equal,” having even one black man in an 
all-white school did something to promote racial equality. One wonders what that 
was. Would it be fair to say that the black students in Gaines, Sweatt, and 
McLaurin desegregated their respective schools? Interestingly, the dictionary 
defines “desegregation” as the “end [of] a policy of racial segregation.”69 Clearly, 
the blacks admitted to the Universities of Missouri, Texas, and Oklahoma did not 
desegregate those schools because the Court did not rule de jure segregation 
unconstitutional and would not overrule the “separate but equal” doctrine until 
Brown.70 Brown, of course, at a minimum, did desegregate public schools, but it 
also required integration, as I explore in Part II below. How ironic and lacking in 
common sense would it be to conclude that Gaines, Sweatt, or McLaurin could 
have integrated his respective school and yet not have desegregated it? 
 63. 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
64. Id. at 639. I explore this in more depth in my article, Sharon E. Rush, Beyond Admissions: 
Racial Equality in Law Schools, 48 FLA. L. REV. 373 (1996). 
65. McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 639-40. 
66. Id. at 639. 
67. Id. at 640. 
 68. This is a persistent problem in the modern classroom with respect to special education and 
magnet classes. See infra Part I.B.2 (discussing the ongoing problems surrounding inter- and intra-
school segregation). 
 69. THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 462 (1st ed. 2001). 
70. See, e.g., Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (holding segregation in public schools unconstitutional). 
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2. What Integration Means: Sharing Space with Dignity 
“We accord persons dignity by assuming that they are good, that 
they share the human qualities we ascribe to ourselves.” 71
 —Nelson Mandela 
Logically, one must conclude that integration is a multi-faceted concept. For 
purposes of this Article, at least two conditions are necessary (but not sufficient) in 
order for a school to be integrated in the context of racial equality. One condition 
involves the physical presence of students of different races in the same school. I 
call this “physical integration,” and it is this condition that tends to take center 
stage when questions of racial equality in education arise.72 This is understandable 
because the first step in the journey to end de jure segregation was to open up 
public spaces to people of color so they could step into the world previously 
available only to whites, where all of the promises and opportunities are offered to 
everyone who lives in a democracy. For some people, racial equality is achieved 
once the public spaces are legally made available to everyone regardless of race, 
that is, desegregated, even if no people of color enter into those spaces, resulting in 
de facto segregation. For other people, racial equality is achieved when even one 
racial minority steps into that public space and has a physical presence in it. Yet the 
situations in Gaines, Sweatt, and McLaurin suggest that for a school to be 
physically integrated, it must be attended by a reasonable number of students of 
different races, although how much of a racial mixture is sufficient to achieve 
physical integration is unclear.73 More recently, this concern has arisen in the 
context of schools trying to achieve a “critical mass” of racial minority students or 
trying to achieve “racial balance.” In fact, as I explore below,74 the Court struggled 
with this question of what constitutes a “critical mass” in 2003 in Grutter v. 
Bollinger,75 and it addressed the question of “racial balancing” in 2007 in Parents 
Involved.76 This Article suggests that the “bottom line” is that schools have to have 
enough integration to debunk the race myth.77
 71. Nelson Mandela, Farewell Address to South African Parliament (May 10, 2004), available at
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Full-text-of-Mandelas-speech-20040510. 
72. See, e.g., Gaines, 305 U.S. at 352 (holding minority student-plaintiff allowed physical 
admittance); Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 636 (dealing specifically with physical admittance of student-plaintiff); 
Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (focusing on the emotional and developmental impact of the physical 
segregation of school children). 
73. Compare Gaines, 305 U.S. at 352 (holding conformance possible by simple admission of 
minority student-plaintiff), and Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 636 (requiring only that black student-plaintiff be 
granted admission), with McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 642 (holding that, in addition to admission, minority 
student-plaintiff “must receive the same treatment at the hands of the state as students of other races”). 
74. See infra Part III (discussing how recent Supreme Court decisions have wrestled with how racial 
integration and racial equality are related and what acceptable means may be employed to achieve 
diversity). 
 75. 539 U.S. 306. 
 76. 551 U.S. 701. 
77. See Liu, supra note 7, at 312-13 (“Whatever answer the Court may give [about what level of 
integration is enough], it should reflect a pragmatic judgment that balances the benefits of achieving a 
meaningful degree of school integration against the risks of reinforcing the perception or reality of racial 
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The second condition of integration is one of the missing links in the racial 
equality chain: it relates to how people of different races are treated within the 
school. How students are treated is about protecting their dignity. If students are 
treated as if the race myth were valid, then dignity integration is missing. Here, it is 
worth emphasizing the duality of the race myth. Today, equality-minded people 
understand that the dignity of people of color is violated when laws, policies, or 
official decisions are premised explicitly on the myth of black inferiority and their 
enforcement results in the dehumanization of the people of color.78 This was the 
situation in Gaines, Sweatt, and McLaurin, for example.79 Naturally, the corollary 
effect of the dehumanization of people of color is the super-humanization of white 
people. 
But my point is even deeper. Some equality-minded people are less likely to 
understand how dignity integration also is missing in schools when laws, policies 
and official decisions are not explicitly premised on the myth of black inferiority 
but nevertheless promote the myth of white superiority and result in the unnatural 
exaltation of whiteness.80 This happens, for example, when magnet programs 
attended predominantly by white students are situated in schools attended 
predominantly by students of color. Such decisions usually are implemented to 
promote racial equality by physically integrating the school.81 In reality, however, 
such plans violate the students’ dignity because of the virtual intra-school 
segregation that usually occurs.82 Moreover, students in magnet programs enjoy far 
more resources and have access to far better educations than the non-magnet 
students.83 This is the race myth playing out, and it violates the dignity of everyone 
in the school community. 
Reconsider Oklahoma’s treatment of McLaurin even after he was admitted to 
the university. To continue to isolate him from his classmates not only raises 
questions about whether he physically integrated the university, but it also clearly 
violated his dignity. The only reason the state wanted to segregate him from his 
classmates was because of its belief in the race myth. Pursuant to the myth of black 
inferiority, white students were being taught that McLaurin was not worthy of 
division in society.”). 
78. Cf. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (“Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a 
detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of law; for 
the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group.”). 
79. See Gaines, 305 U.S. at 349 (“By the operation of the laws of Missouri a privilege has been 
created for white law students which is denied to negroes by reason of their race.”); Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 
631 n.1 (“It appears that the University has been restricted to white students, in accordance with the 
State law.”); McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 641 (“These restrictions . . . signify that the State, in administering 
the facilities it affords for professional and graduate study, sets McLaurin apart from the other students. 
The result is that [he] is handicapped in his pursuit of effective graduate instruction.”). 
80. See Nelson, supra note 17, at 598 (“School officials that employ [physical integration] policies 
often concentrate on the racial makeup of their institutions while neglecting the broader unequal 
educational opportunities being provided to minority students.”) (footnote omitted). 
81. See id. at 610 (“Originally [magnet programs were] created to promote integration and 
diversity”). Ironically, this was part of Seattle’s policy in Parents Involved. See Parents Involved, 551 
U.S. at 816-18 (defining plan including use of magnet schools to increase integration in Seattle schools). 
82. See Nelson, supra note 17, at 610 (“In reality, the classrooms in which students are educated are 
often not racially diverse at all.”) (footnote omitted). 
83. Id. at 611. 
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interacting with them. The way he was treated had nothing to do with his feelings 
about the way he was treated. He might or might not have “bought into” the 
validity of the race myth, and one hopes he did not.84 White society could not have 
cared less about his feelings. Significantly, whenever one aspect of the race myth is 
operational, both sides are. Consequently, pursuant to the myth of white 
superiority, McLaurin’s white classmates were being taught to believe that they 
were “too good” to interact with him. Individual whites, of course, might not have 
believed in it, but the myth evidenced itself throughout society and presented a 
systemic, institutional problem. This unnatural privileging of the white students, 
premised on the deceitful race myth, also violated their dignity. 
Amazingly, the Supreme Court in McLaurin understood that Oklahoma’s laws 
violated the dignity of McLaurin and his white classmates.85 This can be deduced 
from the Court’s reasoning even though it did not use the word “dignity.” For 
example, the Court opined that one reason the intra-school segregation violated his 
equal protection was because it prohibited the “intellectual commingling of 
students”86 and prevented McLaurin from “exchang[ing] views with other 
students.”87 To be able to commingle and exchange views implies not just that 
McLaurin could learn from his white classmates, but also that his white classmates 
could learn from him. The students would and should be able to learn from each 
other. Some of the lessons undoubtedly would be intellectual in nature, but perhaps 
one of the biggest lessons they would learn from each other is that the race myth is 
invalid. Giving the students a chance to share their intellectual passion and also 
their common humanity protects their dignity and promotes racial equality. 
Naturally, the Court’s holding in McLaurin did not guarantee that McLaurin 
and his white classmates would interact with each other. He was free to ignore the 
students, and they were free to ignore him. But McLaurin suggested the students’ 
personal choices about how to treat each other were irrelevant.88 The constitutional 
point was that the state could not preempt their personal choices. “The removal of 
the state restrictions will not necessarily abate individual and group predilections, 
prejudices, and choices.”89 This point is a dramatic departure from the Plessy
 84. Whether (de jure or de facto) segregation “causes” low self-esteem in children of color is a hotly 
contested issue raised by Brown, 347 U.S. at 395 n.11. Justice Thomas adamantly opined that diversity 
policies stigmatize students of color by sanctioning the idea that they are unable to be admitted to 
educational programs based on merit. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 373 (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(“When blacks take positions in the highest places of government, industry, or academia, it is an open 
question today whether their skin color played a part in their advancement. The question itself is the 
stigma—because either racial discrimination did play a role, in which case the person may be deemed 
‘otherwise unqualified,’ or it did not, in which case asking the question itself unfairly marks those blacks 
who would succeed without discrimination.”). His point is different from the point in this Article: 
maintaining racially identifiable and unequal schools validates the race myth. The late Justice Thurgood 
Marshall agreed and opined in Board of Education v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 263 (1991), that “the 
persistence of racially identifiable schools perpetuates the message of racial inferiority.” This 
contentious point is the focus of Part II.B infra.




88. Id. at 641-42. 
89. Id. at 641. 
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opinion that law does not validate the race myth just because it requires 
segregation.90
To summarize thus far, state-imposed inter- and intra-school segregation 
denies the dignity of all students because they are not allowed an opportunity “to 
engage in discussions and exchange views with [each other].”91 Stated most 
emphatically, they are never given a chance to learn for themselves that the race 
myth is invalid and inconsistent with democratic values. The McLaurin Court 
understood this but failed to give this principle effect by overruling Plessy.92 It left 
the resounding message of the validity of the race myth intact by choosing to 
address the issue narrowly: “under these circumstances” the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits race-based alternative treatment by the state.93 Brown,
however, was up to the task and understood that integration—in its fullest sense, 
including physical and dignity integration—was necessary to stop the damage 
caused by the myth and finally bury the myth itself.94
II. THE BROWN COURT’S CHOICES
Gaines, Sweatt, and McLaurin lay a foundation for understanding the 
fundamental harm of segregation: it dehumanizes all people by validating the race 
myth. One can deduce that the justices in Brown grasped the depth of the harm 
caused by segregation by analyzing and comparing the rationale they did not 
employ to support their opinion that “separate educational facilities are inherently 
unequal”95 with the rationale they did employ. Such a comparison provides insights 
into the relationship between dignity and equality and the importance of integration 
in protecting them. 
A. The Rationale Not Employed 
1. Uphold the “Separate but Equal” Doctrine and Focus on Economic Equality 
Rather than tackle the question whether de jure segregation is 
unconstitutional, Brown could have adhered to Plessy and upheld the “separate but 
equal” doctrine. Had it done so, it would have had to confront the obvious 
economic inequality between the white and colored schools. It was well established 
that the schools for whites and those for people of color were woefully unequal.96
Brown could have tried to remedy the economic inequality by ordering that more 
resources be expended on the colored schools. Moreover, renowned scholars and 
90. See supra Part I.A. (discussing how the pre-Brown case Plessy, 163 U.S. 537, based its 
argument on a the assumption that blacks could live separately but equally, and that if legal segregation 
made blacks feel inferior, it was solely because they chose to interpret the law to have this effect).
91. McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 641. 
92. Id. at 641-42. 
93. Id.
94. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95. 
95. Id. at 495. 
96. See generally KLUGER, supra note 9 (discussing inequality in busing, facilities, teachers, 
teaching salaries, teaching materials, per-student funding, length of school year and availability of high 
schools). 
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historians present compelling evidence from the legislative history that an original 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment is consistent with the position that the 
public schools were intended to be segregated but also equal.97
Thus, upholding the “separate but equal” doctrine was a viable constitutional 
choice for Brown. Presumably, if the Court had upheld Plessy and ruled that the 
segregated schools were economically unequal, it would have been motivated and 
even constitutionally compelled to address the inequality.98 However, a judicial 
acknowledgement that people of color were entitled to attend schools economically 
equal to those of white students would have done little to invalidate the race myth. 
Significantly, the only reason for mandating that children be segregated on the 
basis of race—even if their schools are economically equal—is a belief in the 
validity of the race myth. For white society to acknowledge that people of color 
have constitutional status sometimes does not altogether debunk the myth, but 
reinforces it because they should have that constitutional status all the time by 
virtue of being human. Thus, a choice to protect economic equality in the face of 
segregation would have left the myth intact and reinforced it. Recall Gaines,
Sweatt, and McLaurin.99 If the Court had taken this “separate but equal” path, the 
link between dignity and integration would have been missing. Without dignity 
protection, racial equality remains elusive. 
This Article suggests this missing link is the primary reason Brown did not 
choose this path. In fact, the Court explicitly ignored reality and assumed that the 
separate schools did enjoy equal resources.100 The Court phrased the question 
presented: “Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of 
race, even though the physical facilities and other ‘tangible’ factors may be equal, 
deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities?”101
In short, Brown avoided the constitutional challenges associated with economic 
inequality in schools in order to deal with what it saw as a greater obstacle to 
equality: segregation’s role in perpetuating the race myth. 
97. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 56 (1955) (“Hence one may surmise that the Moderates believed they were guaranteeing a 
right to equal benefits from state educational systems supported by general tax funds. But there is no 
evidence whatever showing that for its sponsors the civil rights formula had anything to do with 
unsegregated public schools . . . .”); see also Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism and 
Constitutional Theory, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881 (1995) (arguing that originalism does not support Brown). 
But see Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decision, 81 VA. L. REV. 941 
(1995) (arguing that originalist interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment support Brown).
98. Plessy’s holding is based on a theory of “separate but equal,” which allowed it to avoid finding a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause in legally mandated racial segregation. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551-
52. 
99. See Gaines, 305 U.S. at 337, 351-52 (holding that Missouri could not satisfy the demands of 
“separate but equal” by paying for legal training of blacks at neighboring state law schools, while 
maintaining a segregated law school within the State); Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 636 (holding unanimously 
that the equal protection clause required that a black student be admitted to the University of Texas Law 
School, since the school for blacks did not afford equal facilities); McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 642 (holding 
that under the equal protection clause a black student must receive the same treatment at the hands of the 
state as students of other races). 
100. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492-93. 
101. Id. at 493. 
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2. Strike Down the “Separate but Equal” Doctrine and Do Nothing More 
The Court could have followed a second path and simply struck down de jure
segregation in public schools. Fortunately, Brown did overrule Plessy and held that 
the “separate but equal” doctrine in public schools is unconstitutional.102 If the 
requirement that schools be segregated by law had been the only harm evident to 
the Court in Brown, however, it would have been easy for the Court to remedy it. 
The Court’s opinion could have stopped with its ruling that de jure segregation is 
unconstitutional. The remedy would have been to invalidate those laws that 
required segregation in public schools. 
Under this rationale, it would have been unconstitutional to deny children of 
color103 admission to a public school because of race, but this alone would not 
necessarily have resulted in the end of segregation. Indeed, historically, many 
public schools went to great lengths to keep the schools segregated even after 
Brown. For example, Arkansas officials refused to allow nine black students to 
attend a public school because the officials asserted that Arkansas was not 
obligated to follow Brown’s mandate.104 In Cooper v. Aaron,105 the Court dispelled 
such notions and reaffirmed the principle of Marbury v. Madison106 that the 
Constitution is the supreme law.107 Nevertheless, and notwithstanding Cooper,
schools devised other ways to avoid admitting children of color to white schools.108
Finally, Congress stepped in and passed the 1964 Civil Rights Act to ensure the 
enforcement of Brown.109
Why such resistance to the end of the “separate but equal” doctrine? One 
logical reason posits that white society continued to act on its belief in the validity 
of the race myth. This belief, of course, mandated that whites and people of color 
live separately throughout society, resulting in segregation in housing and other 
social institutions.110 In turn, the high correlation between poverty and race was set 
as well.111 Professor James Ryan calls this failure to acknowledge that school 
102. Id. at 495. 
 103. I intentionally refer to children of color being denied admission to the previous whites-only 
schools and not vice versa because there never has been an on-going struggle to secure admission of 
white students into the schools attended predominantly by students of color. Of course, the controversy 
over affirmative action and attempts to diversify schools has made the issue of whites being denied 
admission to public schools on account of their race relevant in constitutional law. Ironically, though, 
when whites are denied admission arguably on account of race, the schools they want to attend are 
predominantly attended by other whites—not students of color. This flip-flopping of Brown’s core 
message, in light of the persistence of racially identifiable and unequal schools, in fact, is at the heart of 
the controversy surrounding the Court’s plurality opinion in Parents Involved, explored infra at Part 
III.C. 
 104. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., and Susan Eaton, From Little Rock to Seattle and Louisville: Is “All 
Deliberate Speed” Stuck in Reverse?, 30 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 279, 281 (2008). 
 105. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
 106. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 107. 358 U.S. at 18. 
108. See McUsic, supra note 8, at 1337 (pointing out that school districts resisted Brown by, among 
other tactics, shutting down or by employing school vouchers for white children to attend private 
schools). 
 109. 42 U.S.C. § 1971, 2000a-h (2000) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241). 
 110. Ryan, supra note 2, at 140-41. 
111. See GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
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segregation is largely the result of residential segregation the “gaping hole in the 
Court’s desegregation jurisprudence.”112 Undoubtedly, if the Court had taken this 
path, the schools constitutionally not only could have, but would have, remained 
largely de facto segregated.113 The end of de jure segregation, without more, would 
have done little to ensure that public schools were integrated. It would have done 
little to promote racial equality, particularly in education. But it would be the 
continuing belief in the race myth that would help explain why white society would 
continue to accept such inequality and feel no obligation or motivation to remedy it.
Here it is worth returning to Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy.114 Consider 
that, at the time Brown was decided almost sixty years after Plessy, Justice Harlan’s 
dissent in that case proved true. Although he courageously disagreed with the 
Plessy Court about the constitutionality of de jure segregation, he further opined 
that: 
  The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this 
country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in 
wealth, and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all 
time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the 
principles of constitutional liberty. But in view of the Constitution, in 
the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, 
ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our constitution is 
color-blind . . . .115
Curiously, Justice Harlan’s dissent seemed to suggest that even if de jure
segregation is unconstitutional, racial equality would continue to escape the United 
States—forever and as a matter of constitutional liberty.
What could possibly justify such enduring inequality? Perhaps a 
subconscious116 (or conscious) belief in white superiority explains it. The validity 
of the race myth is so entrenched in white society’s psyche117 that even someone as 
equality-minded as Justice Harlan could explicitly opine that whites will always be 
the superior race even if the Constitution is color-blind. 
Thus, had Brown simply ruled de jure segregation unconstitutional and done 
nothing more to remedy the human inequality, this path constitutionally would not 
have resulted in physical integration. Without physical integration, dignity 
integration also is missing. Nor would the races have voluntarily physically 
WHY SEGREGATION MATTERS: POVERTY AND EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY 16 (2005) (“Studies have 
shown that there is a strong relationship between percent poor and percent minority in a school; 
specifically, the share of schools that are high poverty increases as the minority population in a school 
increases.”). 
 112. Ryan, supra note 2, at 140-41. 
113. Id. at 141-42. 
114. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 115.  Id.
116. See Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious 
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322-23 (1987) (arguing that “a large part of” the behavior that produces 
racial discrimination is influenced by subconscious motivations). 
117. Id. at 322. See also Rush, Sharing Space: Why Racial Goodwill Isn’t Enough, supra note 35 
(providing an in-depth exploration of white society’s general denial of persistent racial inequality and 
racism). 
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integrated for a variety of practical, among other, reasons. But a significant 
limitation on white society’s willingness to integrate the schools physically was its 
continued belief in the race myth. This path would have resulted in a de facto
Plessy school system. Looking back, almost all equality-minded people would see 
that such a system would have violated the principles of dignity and equality. The 
mystery is why equality-minded people today cannot see how the sanctioning of 
racially identifiable and unequal schools, particularly if the system is called what it 
is—a de facto Plessy system—continues to violate the principles of dignity and 
equality. 
Thus, it is important to emphasize that de facto segregation, particularly at the 
time of Brown, validated the race myth. Nothing but a belief in the myth of white 
superiority and the inhumanity of people of color could justify white society’s deep 
desire to segregate itself after Brown ruled de jure segregation unconstitutional.118
But if the Court had taken this path and simply struck down de jure segregation, 
then white society’s resistance to integration or, stated alternatively, its insistence 
on remaining segregated, also would have been much less controversial. For the 
Brown Court, it was important to do more than simply rule de jure segregation 
unconstitutional.119 But even the Court itself was unsure exactly what the remedy 
should be and it put off that decision until it decided Brown II a year later. 
B. The Chosen Rationale: Attack Segregation and Mandate Integration of Schools 
Brown took a third path because it understood to a large degree that 
segregation itself was the harm that needed to be remedied. Chief Justice Warren, 
in the opinion of the Court wrote: “Segregation of white and colored children in 
public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is 
greater when it has the sanction of law; for the policy of separating the races is 
usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group.”120 Notice that the 
Court opined that legally mandated segregation exacerbates—does not cause—the 
harm. Segregation—even without the sanction of law—causes the harm.121
Logically, one must ask what is the harm of segregation, whether it be de jure
or de facto? It denies the equality and dignity of all people by sanctioning the 
validity of the race myth. Controversially, relying on social science studies,122
Brown nevertheless correctly highlighted how erroneous and destructive of equality 
and dignity the race myth is. In one of its most famous lines, the Court said that 
“[t]o separate [black] children from others of similar age and qualifications solely 
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the 
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be 
118. See Regina Austin, Back to Basics: Returning to the Matter of Black Inferiority and White 
Supremacy in the Post-Brown Era, 6 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 79, 81 (2004) (“At the root of [the post-
Brown failures] lies the pervasive ideological insistence on the inevitability of black inferiority and 
white supremacy and the naturalness of the unequal distribution of resources and opportunities that they 
justify.”).
119. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (noting the detrimental effect segregated schools have on children). 
120. Id.
121. See id. (“A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn.”). 
122. Id. at 494 n.11 (citing to several psychological studies supporting the assertion that de jure
segregation harms black children). 
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undone.”123
This is a direct acknowledgement of, and assault on, the validity of the race 
myth. Brown emphatically explained that segregation denied black children their 
dignity. As explored in Part III below, because of the dual nature of the race myth, 
the harm in Brown, although not mentioned by the Court but one of the main points 
of this Article, also was suffered by white children who lived under the false reality 
that they were a superior class of human beings.124
What remedy could help to redress that harm? Brown II held that the way to 
remedy the harm suffered by black children was for the “District Courts to take 
such proceedings and enter such order and decrees consistent with this opinion as 
are necessary and proper to admit [them] to public schools on a racially 
nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed.”125 Clearly, for the students 
involved in the litigation, admission to the whites-only schools was their remedy. 
The physical integration of public schools, brought about by the Brown litigation 
was an unparalleled moment in constitutional history. It was the beginning of an 
official exposure by the Supreme Court—interpreting the supreme law of the 
land—that the race myth was just that—a myth! 
This interpretation of Brown not surprisingly, even if controversially,126
supports the proposition that Brown’s mandate is that public schools had to be 
integrated. Eventually, in Green, the Court made this crystal clear and opined that 
the school board in that case “must be required to formulate a new plan and . . . 
fashion steps which promise realistically to convert promptly [from a dual system] 
to a [unitary] system without a ‘white’ school and a ‘Negro’ school, but just 
schools.”127 In other words, Green interpreted Brown’s mandate to mean that 
schools could not be racially identifiable. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Board of Education,128 the Court ordered that students be bused to various schools 
if that was what was necessary for a school district to achieve unitary status.129
Significantly, the effort behind Brown’s mandate served a purpose much 
deeper than just achieving physical integration in schools. Bringing children of 
different races together was premised on protecting their dignity.130 Integration, in 
123. Id. at 494. The reinforcement of the race myth that resulted from the Court’s failure to address 
the harm segregation also causes white children is explored in Part III infra.
124. See, e.g., Jordan Blair Woods, Comment, Taking the “Hate” Out of Hate Crimes: Applying 
Unfair Advantage Theory to Justify the Enhanced Punishment of Opportunistic Bias Crimes, 56 UCLA
L. REV. 489, 517 n.139 (2008) (“Even though many white Americans do not overtly express racist 
thinking, it does not mean that their underlying belief structures have not been saturated with an 
ideology of difference that says white is always, in every way, superior.”). 
125. Brown, 349 U.S. at 301. 
126. See, e.g., Graglia, supra note 15, at 912-13 (suggesting that Brown merely required 
desegregation and that the persistence of racially identifiable schools motivated the Court in Green, 391 
U.S. at 440-41, to move to an interpretation of Brown that required integration in previously de jure
segregated schools). 
127. Green, 391 U.S. at 442. 
 128. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
129. Id. at 29-31. 
130. See Peter M. Shane, School Desegregation Remedies and the Fair Governance of Schools, 132 
U. PA. L. REV. 1041, 1093 (1984) (“As a restorative measure, integration is designed to undo much of 
the intended discrimination that went hand-in-hand with the establishment of segregation. To the extent 
intentional segregation instilled in blacks feelings of inferiority, integration restores the dignity of the 
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other words, was a rich concept that was built on an understanding that dignity and 
integration went hand-in-hand and both were viewed by Brown as necessary to 
achieve racial equality.131
III. POST-BROWN CONFUSION: EQUALITY BECOMES A MOVING TARGET
The Brown Court deserves enormous credit for advancing racial equality 
because its decision marked the beginning of the end of the “separate but equal” 
doctrine in all public places. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the opinion is 
limited and imperfect for one critical reason: the Court’s acknowledgment that 
segregation harms black children focused on debunking the myth of black 
inferiority, but the Court’s opinion said nothing about the invalidity of the myth of 
white superiority.132 This important omission allowed white society to continue to 
function, often subconsciously, on the myth of white superiority even as it 
officially and consciously denounced the myth of black inferiority. 
The harmful consequences of this omission are numerous and enormous. In 
the area of education, this omission facilitated a move by the Court away from the 
heart of Brown’s core meaning about human equality and its relationship to racial 
integration in two iconic cases that, with hindsight, have contributed to the 
confusion about the true meaning of Brown. In the first case, San Antonio School 
District v. Rodriguez,133 the Court upheld the constitutionality of economic 
inequality in de facto segregated schools.134 Brown, of course, was not about 
economic equality, but neither is economic equality irrelevant to racial equality, 
especially in light of the reality that schools in the United States are largely racially 
identifiable and economically unequal.135 In the second case, University of 
minority.”). 
131. See Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 
NEB. L. REV. 740, 763 (2006) (“[I]n these segregation cases members of our highest court displayed a 
genuine concern for the value of human dignity. They may not have articulated their opinions in the 
language of dignity, but their expressed outrage at the insidious government-sponsored disparagement of 
blacks is most clearly and persuasively formulated by direct appeal to this powerful concept.”(citing 
William A. Parent, Constitutional Values and Human Dignity, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS,
HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 47 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds. 1992))). 
132. See Leon A. Higginbotham, Jr., The Ten Precepts of American Slavery Jurisprudence: Chief 
Justice Roger Taney’s Defense and Justice Thurgood Marshall’s Condemnation of the Precept of Black 
Inferiority, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1695, 1705 (1996) (supporting the idea that Thurgood Marshall helped 
to debunk the myth of black inferiority by emphasizing that “no one in their right mind could ever 
imagine, and no court under the rule of law could possibly determine, that blacks were inferior to other 
human beings,” though his work did not emphasize the flip side—that whites are not a superior race). 
 133.  411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
134. Id. at 50-51 (“While it is no doubt true that reliance on local property taxation for school 
revenues provides less freedom of choice with respect to expenditures for some districts than for others, 
the existence of ‘some inequality’ in the manner in which the State’s rationale is achieved is not alone a 
sufficient basis for striking down the entire system.”). 
135. See, e.g., Derrick Darby, Educational Inequality and the Science of Diversity in Grutter: A 
Lesson for the Reparations Debate in the Age of Obama, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 755, 767 (2009) 
(discussing post-Brown challenges in realizing equal opportunity for blacks beyond merely 
implementing and enforcing anti-discrimination laws, including widespread socioeconomic racial 
inequalities that arguably did not give blacks equal access to civil and political participation in American 
society).
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California Regents v. Bakke,136 the Court dropped its focus on the relationship 
between equality and integration and instead began to adopt the concept of 
diversity in education, which might or might not include racial diversity.137
Remarkably, both Rodriguez and Bakke were decided in the 1970s—a period 
during which the Court held fast in other cases to Brown’s true meaning about the 
relationship between integration in education and racial equality.138 This confusing 
period is traceable to Brown’s failure to tackle, in its entirety, the invalidity of the 
race myth. 
A. The Sanctioning of Economic Inequality in Education 
1. Rodriguez Muddles Brown’s Message about Human Equality 
Brown’s strong message about the importance of integrating public schools to 
protect children’s dignity met social and practical obstacles. Understandably, given 
the persistence of racially identifiable and unequal schools, advocates of racial 
equality logically invoked Brown to focus the Court’s attention on achieving 
economic equality in education.139 In Rodriguez,140 decided less than twenty years 
after Brown, the Court had an opportunity to revisit the presumption made in 
Brown about economic equality between white and black schools by addressing the 
question whether it is constitutional for states to fund schools based on local 
property taxes.141 Pursuant to such taxing schemes, per pupil expenditures naturally 
are higher in school districts with higher property tax bases and are lower, 
sometimes significantly, in districts with lower property tax bases.142 For example, 
in Rodriguez, the plaintiffs resided in districts with lower property tax bases and the 
per pupil expenditure was $356,143 while per pupil expenditure in the more affluent 
parts of the city was $594.144 The plaintiffs alleged that the discrepancy violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.145
 136. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
137. Id. at 317-18. 
138. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 30-31 (placing a premium on integration, mandating busing to 
effectively desegregate Charlotte); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 200 (1973) 
(holding that purposeful discrimination in a substantial portion of a school system provided a legitimate 
foundation for an inference of district-wide discriminatory intent triggering Brown’s requirement to 
“effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system”). 
 139. Brief for American Jewish Congress as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 20, Green v. 
Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (No. 695), 1968 WL 129317 (“If there is a contention that 
economic or other pressures in the community inhibit the free exercise of the choice, there must be a 
judicial appraisal of it, for ‘freedom of choice’ is acceptable only if the choice is free in the practical 
context of its exercise. If there are extraneous pressures which deprive the choice of its freedom, the 
school board may be required to adopt affirmative measures to counter them.”). 
 140. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 141. I explore this in greater depth in my article, Sharon E. Rush, The Heart of Equal Protection: 
Education and Race, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 8-11 (1997) [hereinafter Rush, The Heart of 
Equal Protection].
142. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 15-16. 
143. Id. at 12. 
144. Id. at 13. 
145. See id. at 6 (“[T]he panel rendered its judgment in a per curiam opinion holding the Texas 
school finance system unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
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Curiously, the Court omitted any consideration of racial equality from its 
analysis. Significantly, the Rodriguez plaintiffs were Mexican-American and the 
racial composition of the students in their schools was approximately 90% 
Mexican-American and “over 6% [was] Negro.”146 In contrast, the racial 
composition of the wealthier school district was “predominantly ‘Anglo,’ having 
only 18% Mexican-Americans and less than 1% Negroes.”147 The Court accepted 
Texas’ conclusion that the reason the predominantly Mexican-American students 
received less per pupil than their Anglo counterparts was “happenstance,”148 and 
therefore constitutionally unimportant. Because racial equality was not an issue and 
because the Court held that education is not a fundamental right,149 the state’s 
financing scheme merely had to meet rational basis review and thus easily passed 
constitutional muster.150
Recall that Brown ignored the extant economic inequality between the white 
and black schools so that it could focus on the concept of racial equality in the 
context of segregation and held that de jure segregation in public schools is 
unconstitutional.151 Certainly, everyone knew that race and poverty were highly 
correlated at that time in history (and continue to be today). Yet within one 
generation, which is not even enough time for the vestiges of de jure segregation to 
disappear, Rodriquez ignored the extant racial inequality due to de facto
segregation in schools so that it could focus on the economic equality. The Court 
held that economic inequality in the still de facto segregated schools is 
constitutional.152
Given that Brown was concerned about human equality and took the first step 
toward protecting the dignity of children of color by ruling de jure segregation 
unconstitutional,153 Rodriguez could have bolstered its decision about human 
equality by addressing how this type of segregation is inconsistent with Brown’s 
message to allow economic inequality to exist in racially identifiable schools. 
Unfortunately, Rodriguez did not take the logical step after Brown and failed to 
Amendment.”). 
146. Id. at 12. 
147. Id. at 12-13. 
148. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 53 (“Appellees further urge that the Texas system is 
unconstitutionally arbitrary because it allows the availability of local taxable resources to turn on 
‘happenstance.’”); Id. at 55 (“[W]e cannot say that such disparities are the product of a system that is so 
irrational as to be invidiously discriminatory.”). 
149. Id. at 37 (“We have carefully considered each of the arguments supportive of the District 
Court’s finding that education is a fundamental right or liberty and have found those arguments 
unpersuasive.”). 
150. Id. at 55 (“The constitutional standard under the Equal Protection Clause is whether the 
challenged state action rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose or interest . . . . We hold that the 
Texas Plan abundantly satisfies this standard.” (citing McGinnis v. Royster 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973)). 
Justice Marshall at least cites Sweatt and McLaurin to support his opinion that the Texas financing 
scheme is inconsistent with the Court’s prior jurisprudence that “unequal” schools are prohibited by the 
Constitution. Id. at 84-85 (Marshall, J., dissenting). His dissent, however, is not based on race but rather 
on the plan being arbitrary and failing rational basis review. Id. at 129-30. 
 151. KLUGER, supra note 9, at 716. 
152. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 6 (reversing the decision of the District Court); id. at 12-13 
(establishing the economic inequality is de facto segregated schools).
153. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (holding that “separate but equal” in unconstitutional in the “field of 
public education). 
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take notice of the correlation between racial and economic inequality in 
education.154 Instead, Rodriguez upheld the constitutionality of economic inequality 
in education and essentially eliminated the possibility that the Court will find that 
there is a constitutionally significant relationship between economic and racial 
equality in education cases even where schools are racially identifiable—as they 
were in Rodriguez—because of de facto segregation.155
By sanctioning the existence of racially identifiable and unequal schools,156
Rodriguez seriously undermined Brown’s primary message about the importance of 
integration in the struggle to achieve racial equality. In this way, not only did 
efforts to connect Brown’s racial message with the economic status of the plaintiffs 
in Rodriguez fail, but the Court’s unwillingness to address the link between race 
and poverty has diminished the significance of Brown’s message about the 
importance of integration in the struggle to achieve human equality.
Simultaneously, the tragic reality of segregation is settling in as 
constitutionally and socially acceptable in American jurisprudence. Early into the 
twenty-first century, public schools are racially identifiable and racial minority 
schools are disproportionately poor.157 Researchers at the Harvard Civil Rights 
Project, particularly Professor Gary Orfield, describe this stark reality: 
Studies have shown that there is a strong relationship between 
percent poor and percent minority in a school; specifically, the share 
of schools that are high poverty increases as the minority population 
in a school increases. Similarly, as white enrollment increases, the 
share of schools that are high poverty schools correspondingly 
decreases. For example, 88 percent of high minority schools (more 
than 90 percent minority) are high poverty schools (more than 50 
percent of the students are on free and reduced lunch). The 
corresponding share of low minority schools (less than 10 percent) 
that are also high poverty schools is 15 percent. The reality of 
segregation by race and poverty means that, while the majority of 
white students attend middle class schools, minority students in 
racially segregated schools are very likely attending a school of 
concentrated poverty. These patterns are not limited to cities; 
increasingly, suburban rings with increasing minority enrollment 
also experience segregation by poverty and race.158
By disclaiming any constitutionally significant relationship between race and 
poverty and unequal schools,159 Rodriguez sanctioned a paradigm that sets up an 
intractable problem in the struggle to achieve human equality, particularly in 
education. Rodriguez muddles the message of Brown because it suggests that 
 154. Rush, The Heart of Equal Protection, supra note 141, at 10. 
155. Id.
156. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 55.
157. See GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIV., WHY 
SEGREGATION MATTERS: POVERTY AND EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY 16 (2005) (examining the link 
between the racial makeup of public schools and economic inequality). 
158. Id.
159. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 56. 
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neither physical nor dignity integration in public schools is important. 
To summarize, the disconnect between the Court’s reasoning in Brown and 
Rodriguez sanctions the existence of racially segregated and economically unequal 
schools. From the perspective of Rodriguez, it seems that Brown actually chose the 
second path analyzed above—strike down de jure segregation and do nothing 
more.160 That is, it seems the Rodriguez Court interpreted Brown to stand for the 
proposition that students are harmed by attending segregated schools only if the 
segregation is mandated by law.161 But as examined above, Brown opined that 
segregation itself is harmful to children.162 As explored in the next part, numerous 
post-Brown decisions also premised their rulings on the same understanding. 
2. Paradoxically, Integration Efforts Continued after Rodriguez
In reality, and Rodriguez notwithstanding, post-Brown decisions were heavily 
invested in ensuring the integration of public schools. Recall that Green ordered the 
end of racially identifiable schools,163 and Swann subsequently upheld the use of 
busing students to schools to achieve integration and comply with Brown’s 
mandate to achieve a unitary system of education devoid of racial discrimination.164
Moreover, and usually to the chagrin of white parents, busing plans often required 
white children to attend the less resource-rich schools that children of color claimed 
as their own.165 Decades after Brown, courts throughout the country functioned 
under an interpretation of Brown that the harm of de jure segregation was not just 
that it was legally mandated, but that segregation itself was harmful.166
But “why” remains the question. Why did the courts care so much about 
school integration even as they allowed in Rodriguez for schools to be 
economically unequal and racially identifiable? The answer lies in understanding 
Brown’s true meaning: integration is necessary to invalidate the race myth, the 
whole race myth. Not only does the widespread social and legal acceptance of 
160. See discussion supra Part II.A.2 (analyzing how merely striking de jure segregation in schools 
would likely not have ended de facto segregation). 
161. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 54-55 (holding disparities in educational quality derived from public 
school financing structure does not create unconstitutional segregation). 
162. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (declaring that such segregation constitutes “a denial of the equal 
protection of the laws”); see also id. at 493 (Here, the Court notes that children who attend segregated 
schools and receive substandard education will suffer in their professional lives because they have not 
been exposed to the wide array of cultural and inherently democratic values that are crucial to the proper 
functioning of American society). 
163. Green, 391 U.S. at 442. 
164. Swann, 402 U.S. at 30-32. 
 165. STEVE FARKAS & JEAN JOHNSON, PUB. AGENDA & PUB. EDUC. NETWORK, TIME TO MOVE ON:
AFRICAN AMERICAN AND WHITE PARENTS SET AN AGENDA FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS 26-27 (1998) 
(finding that only twenty-two percent of white parents support busing for racial integration). 
166. But see Milliken, 418 U.S. at 735 (distinguishing between de jure and de facto segregation and 
finding that only the former permitted remedial school busing legislation); Ryan, supra note 2, at 140 
(suggesting this distinction came too late because whites had already fled to the suburbs and left the 
inner-city schools to the children of color, making integration virtually impossible in any event). The 
Court’s distinction in Milliken between de jure and de facto segregation is central to the Court’s opinion 
in Parents Involved. Still, consistent with Brown, the Court continues to believe in integration, albeit 
under the rhetoric of “diversity.” Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720-22 (recognizing “diversity” as a 
“compelling interest” for purposes of applying strict scrutiny standard of review). 
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racially identifiable and unequal schools send a message of the validity of the race 
myth, but children who are separated from each other are less likely, and perhaps 
unable, to learn that they are racially equal.167 Without integrated schools, they are 
less likely to learn the necessary skills they need to develop healthy race relations 
built on respect for each other’s human dignity.168 Stated alternatively, public 
spaces must be inhabited by people of all races in order for the civic and social 
lessons to be learned that are necessary in a democratic society to attain and sustain 
racial equality.169 Integration is critical to the achievement of this goal and this 
explains why the Court sanctioned it, albeit in limited forms, in the context of 
higher education even before Brown in cases like Gaines, Sweatt, and McLaurin.170
Those early cases, when read in the context of the modern cases in which the Court 
sanctions “diversity,” help to elucidate why integration continues to be imperative. 
B. The Shift from Equality to Diversity in Education 
Imagine a young person of color who attended grammar and high school 
during de jure segregation or shortly thereafter and who wanted to attend medical 
school in the United States. Given the reality that K-12 segregated schools were 
terribly unequal with respect to their resources,171 it would have been unrealistic to 
expect applicants of color to be as academically competitive on paper as white 
applicants. A young person of color applying to medical school in the early 1970s 
simply was unlikely to have the equivalent educational background as most of the 
white applicants. This did not mean, of course, that applicants of color (or even 
whites) who did not have an equal educational background compared to other 
applicants would have been unqualified to be admitted to medical school. Rather, 
the admission of qualified applicants of color to the historically white medical 
schools would reflect white society’s commitment to Brown’s core message: 
integration of schools—even at the college level—protects students’ dignity and 
equality. This commitment, however, would be couched, not in terms of wanting an 
167. See Liu, supra note 7, at 282-83 (“The importance of racially integrated public schools to 
promoting tolerance and mutual respect in our multiracial society requires little elaboration given the 
Court’s own pronouncements on the issue. Across many contexts, the Court has made clear that 
irrational prejudice, animus, and stereotypes distort the proper functioning of our 
democracy.”) (footnote omitted). 
168. See id. at 284 (arguing that individuals who attend diverse schools at a young age are more 
likely to attend more diverse colleges and universities, to inhabit more diverse neighborhoods, to seek 
employment at more diverse institutions, and to maintain diverse groups of friends at a later age). 
169. Id. at 282-83. 
170. McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 641 (holding the practice of segregating an African-American student 
from the rest of the law school student body serves to “impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage 
in discussions and exchange views with other students, and in general, to learn his profession”); 
Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 635 (“The State must provide legal education for the [African-American] petitioner 
in conformity with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and provide it at soon as 
it does for applicants of any other group.” (quoting Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 633 
(1948))); Gaines, 305 U.S. at 351 (holding that Missouri was bound to furnish to African-Americans 
facilities for legal education “substantially equal to those which the State there afforded for persons of 
the white race”). 
171. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Separate and Unequal: American Public Education Today, 52 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1461, 1470 (2003) (referring to statistics from 1972 that show that on average, white children 
received fifteen to twenty percent more in education funding than black children). 
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integrated class, but rather in terms of wanting a diverse class. 
1. Bakke and Diversity 
The University of California at Davis Medical School (“Davis”), a public 
university, took a leadership role in trying to promote racial equality by integrating 
its medical school.172 In the early 1970s, pursuant to faculty policy, the school 
decided to do its best to ensure that at least sixteen self-identified racially and/or 
economically disadvantaged applicants were accepted into its class of 100 
students.173 The school asserted several reasons for its policy, two of which are 
central to this Article, to increase the enrollment of disadvantaged students to 
remedy past societal discrimination and to provide a diverse educational experience 
for all of its students in the class.174
Alan Bakke, a white male applicant who did not categorize himself as 
“disadvantaged,” was rejected admission by Davis two years in a row.175 In each 
year his credentials on paper outmatched those of other applicants who were 
admitted, including those self-identified as “disadvantaged.”176 Bakke alleged that 
Davis’ admissions policy violated his equal protection rights and discriminated 
against him on the basis of race.177 He filed suit in California state court and won at 
the trial and appellate levels.178 The Supreme Court decided to hear his case and 
upheld the decisions of the California courts.179
The first reason in support of the school’s policy—to remedy past societal 
discrimination—was insufficient to make the policy constitutional. The Court held 
that this rationale could not withstand constitutional scrutiny because the school’s 
policy was not implemented by the state for the purpose of correcting specific legal 
wrongs.180 This was quite significant because, as noted, the applicants to Davis 
were the first generation after Brown that even had a chance to attend desegregated 
schools in preparation for higher education.181 As it was, their elementary and high 
schools likely were segregated and had far fewer resources compared to the public 
schools attended by most whites because not enough time had elapsed for the black 
schools to catch up to the white ones between Brown and the first post-Brown
generation’s applications to Davis.182 Whatever discrimination those applicants 
172. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 273 n.1. 
173. Id. at 274-75. 
174. Id. at 305-06. The two other reasons for the school’s admissions policy were that it wanted to 
provide role models to younger generations and to increase the chances that the applicants would return 
to their communities and provide much needed medical care. Id.
175. Id. at 276-77. 
176. Id. at 277 n.7. 
177. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 277-78 
178. Id. at 279-80. 
179. Id. at 271. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments, holding the special admissions program 
unlawful and directing Davis to admit Mr. Bakke, though the Court reversed the California courts’ 
judgment enjoining Davis from considering race during the admissions process. Id. at 271-72. 
180. Id. at 305 (“[T]here has been no determination by the legislature or a responsible administrative 
agency that the University engaged in a discriminatory practice requiring remedial efforts.”). 
181. Id. at 371-72 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
182. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 372 (“[T]he conclusion is inescapable that applicants to medical school 
must be few indeed who endured the effects of de jure segregation, the resistance to Brown I, or the 
equally debilitating pervasive private discrimination fostered by our long history of official 
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suffered during their school years was not “past” discrimination: it shaped their 
lives. Moreover, to think the schools would ever become economically equal 
required the assumption that white society was trying to achieve racial equality, but 
the opposite was true: parts of the country resisted Brown with a vengeance.183
Recall that in Rodriguez, the Court constitutionalized the disconnect between 
economic and racial equality in education.184 If ever there was a time when 
implementation of an affirmative action policy could have been traced to the need 
to remedy past discrimination, it was Bakke.
Simultaneously, and in complete contradiction to Bakke’s reasoning, the Court 
continued to uphold Brown’s mandate and held fast to the need to integrate public 
schools.185 In fact, as late as 1992, fourteen years after Bakke, United States v. 
Fordice186 concluded that the need to integrate public schools to eliminate the 
effects of de jure segregation applied to public universities.187 In Fordice,
Mississippi’s public universities remained racially identifiable long after Brown
ended de jure segregation.188 Moreover, Mississippi’s public universities had 
admissions policies that were racially neutral and offered potential applicants a 
“freedom of choice.”189 There was a catch, however. Racially identifiable schools 
had different admissions standards.190 Admissions standards were much higher at 
the historically white colleges.191 This concerned the Court because in the early 
1960s, the University intentionally adopted a policy that required higher 
standardized test scores at the white universities for purpose of ensuring that few, if 
any, blacks would qualify.192 The Court traced the current admissions policies back 
to those set with a discriminatory purpose, even as it said there was no 
discriminatory purpose in the current policies: 
If the State perpetuates policies and practices traceable to its prior 
system that continue to have segregative effects . . . and such policies 
are without sound educational justification and can be practicably 
eliminated, the State has not satisfied its burden of proving that it has 
dismantled its prior system. Such policies run afoul of [the 
Constitution], even though the State has abolished the legal 
requirement that whites and blacks be educated separately and has  
discrimination and yet come to the starting line with an education equal to whites.” (citation omitted)) 
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
183. See, e.g., Green, 391 U.S. at 432-33 (reviewing a racially segregated school system maintained 
after Brown).
184. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 23-24. 
185. See id. at 30 (“[I]t is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he 
is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to 
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.” (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 
493)). 
 186. 505 U.S. 717 (1992). 
187. Id. at 727. 
188. Id. at 736. 
189. Id. at 727. 
190. Id. at 734-35. 
191. Id.
192. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 733-34. 
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established racially neutral policies not animated by a discriminatory 
purpose.193
Once stripped of its mixed-signals, the Court’s reasoning is quite telling about 
the importance of integration in educational equality and also racial equality. In the 
1960s, of course, shortly after Brown, it was not surprising that people of color 
would score lower than whites on standardized tests. This was the essence of 
Bakke’s complaint; he scored much higher on the MCAT than did the 
“disadvantaged” applicants.194 In any event, it would be blatantly unconstitutional 
to set admissions standards for the purpose of excluding racial minorities.195 But 
notice that Fordice explicitly clarifies that Mississippi’s policies were not 
motivated by a discriminatory purpose.196 Rather, the Court addressed the 
“segregative effects” of the different admissions standards.197 In other words, 
Mississippi’s “racially neutral” policies that nevertheless maintained racially 
identifiable schools—forty years after Brown—were still constitutionally 
suspect.198 But Fordice also had to get around the “disparate impact” cases in 
which the Court established the principle that disparate impact, without intent, is 
insufficient to support a claim of race discrimination.199
Fordice, for all of its mixed signals, is remarkably true to Brown’s message 
about the importance of integration, explicitly applying Brown to public colleges 
and universities.200 Moreover, Fordice acknowledged that present admissions 
standards in Mississippi higher education were not only “traceable to the de jure
system and were originally adopted for a discriminatory purpose, [but also had] 
present discriminatory effects,” causing universities to remain racially 
identifiable.201 The Court held that Mississippi needed to comply with Brown and 
eliminate its dual system of segregated colleges and universities without actually 
saying that the school officials intended the racially discriminatory results—even if 
school officials should have recognized that some actions of the State continued to 
foster segregation.202 By tracing the school officials’ decisions back to the time of 
193. Id. at 731-32 (footnote omitted). 
194. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 277. 
195. See id. at 289 (finding that universities cannot establish admissions limitations based upon race 
and ethnicity). 
196. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 735. 
197. Id. at 734-35. 
198. Id. The claim against Mississippi was based on the Equal Protection Clause and Title IV of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000d-2000d-7 (1964). Id. at 724. 
199. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (“[T]he invidious quality of a law claimed 
to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.”); Keyes,
413 at 209-10 (holding that while racial imbalance is not itself unconstitutional, there is a presumption 
that a present racial imbalance is the result of intentional state action in an area previously de jure
segregated).
200. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 240 (“[T]he invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially 
discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.”). 
201. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 734-37 (cataloguing the disparate effects on African American applicants 
by relying solely on ACT scores). 
202. Id. at 729 (“The Equal Protection Clause is offended by ‘sophisticated as well as simple-minded 
modes of discrimination’ . . . . If policies traceable to the de jure system are still in force and have 
discriminatory effects, those policies too must be reformed to the extent practicable and consistent with 
sound educational practices.” (quoting Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939))). 
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de jure segregation, which was logical and reflected the reality that schools remain 
racially identifiable and unequal because of de jure segregation, the Court 
supported Brown, while repeatedly affirming a disparate impact theory.203
Some of the dissonance between Bakke and Fordice is cushioned by Bakke’s
acceptance of Davis’ other relevant justification for its admissions policy: to admit 
a diverse class.204 Although the Court struck down as unconstitutional the set-aside 
policy, it was constitutionally sympathetic to Davis’ mission to admit more 
students of color because they added “diversity” to the classroom and college 
community.205
A state college or university’s interest in admitting a diverse class, particularly 
a racially diverse class, illustrates the richness of the concept of integration. First, 
racial diversity cannot exist unless there is a physical presence of students of 
different races in the class.206 Simultaneously, because diversity adds a benefit to 
all students in the class, this means that the physical presence of racially diverse 
students alone is not sufficient to meet the school’s goal. Rather, the racially 
diverse students must contribute to each other’s education. Justice Powell opined 
that the “‘nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure’ to 
the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples.”207
Inherent in diversity is the understanding that beneficial lessons have to come from 
students themselves.208 Students’ racial identities, experiences, opinions, and views 
inform and enrich other students in ways that a non-racially diverse class cannot. In 
this way, a racially diverse class is an integrated class because both physical and 
dignity integration are valued. 
Ironically, admissions policies have traditionally looked to admit diverse 
classes because schools are communities. Some students will be interested in the 
humanities, others in the sciences. Some will play sports and others will play music 
or participate in drama. If a school wants to have a debate team, or a choir, or a 
volunteer club, it has to admit students who are interested in assuming those 
leadership roles. College communities need their students to be diverse in order for 
those very communities to exist and thrive. Because every student in the 
community has a unique personality, interests, talents, opinions, and experiences, 
as a matter of human nature, every class is diverse. 
203. See, e.g., id. at 741 (“We do not suggest that absent discriminatory purpose the assignment of 
different missions to various institutions in a State’s higher education system would raise an equal 
protection issue where one or more of the institutions become or remain predominately black or white. 
But here the issue is whether the State has sufficiently dismantled its prior dual system . . . [or whether 
it] interfere[s] with student choice and tend[s] to perpetuate the segregated system.”); id. at 742-43 
(“Because the former de jure segregated system of public universities in Mississippi impeded the free 
choice of prospective students, the State in dismantling that system must take the necessary steps to 
ensure that this choice now is truly free.”). 
204. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12 (The attainment of a diverse student body is clearly “a 
constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education.”). 
205. Id. at 312 (“[T]he atmosphere of ‘speculation, experiment and creation’—so essential to the 
quality of higher education—is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student body.”). 
206. Id. at 401-02 (“If we are ever to become a fully integrated society, one in which the color of a 
person’s skin will not determine the opportunities available to him or her, we must be willing to take 
steps to open those doors” to positions of influence, affluence, and prestige.). 
207. Id. at 313 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). 
208. Id. at 312. 
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2. Bakke: What Happened to Equality? 
Notwithstanding this reality, the concept of diversity in education is highly 
controversial. Much of the controversy stems from the idea that diversity is broadly 
defined and that Bakke’s definition of diversity included racial diversity.209 This is 
worth emphasizing: diversity is controversial because it includes racial diversity. 
Amazingly, including racial diversity within the broader concept was controversial 
from the get-go, even though admitting a racially diverse class at the time of Bakke 
was simply a statement by school officials that they needed, at a minimum, to 
physically integrate their classes.210 After all, busing was inappropriate at the 
college level even though this remedy was mandated all around the country for 
public schools K-12 as a means to comply with Brown and achieve racial 
equality.211
Somehow the link between equality and integration became all but untethered 
in Bakke as the rhetoric focused on “diversity.”212 Consequently, Bakke took a 
much narrower approach than perhaps was necessary, focusing not on the concrete 
goals of integration and racial equality, but on the ambiguous concept of 
“diversity.” Perhaps this helps explain why Justice Powell, who supported the 
diversity rationale, highlighted that it is a broad concept.213 As long as diversity is 
broadly defined, it is less threatening to the racial groups in power because they too 
can add diversity to a class. To emphasize his point, Justice Powell said that 
students who herald from different geographical regions can add diversity to a 
class.214 From this perspective, each of the 100 students in Davis’ class could have 
come from a different state or country and the class would have been diverse. But if 
the students had all been from one racial group (white), the class would not have 
been integrated. Although he watered down his opinion, Justice Powell seemed to 
understand that college officials must be allowed to consider the race of an 
209. Id. at 317 (Much of this controversy stems from the fact that the Bakke court broadly defined 
diversity, stating that “race or ethnic background may be deemed a ‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s 
file.”) (emphasis added). 
210. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 272. 
211. Swann, 402 U.S. at 29-30 (discussing the importance of busing students as an effective means of 
dismantling a dual system of education). 
212. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314 (“Ethnic diversity . . . is only one element in a range of factors . . . .”); 
see also Annalisa Jabaily, Color Me Blind: Deference, Discretion, and Voice in Higher Education After 
Grutter, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 515, 527 (2008) (arguing that when Bakke “translated racial 
categories into a diverse standard it introduced colorblindness into a purportedly race-conscious 
program”). 
213. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315 (“The diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a 
far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single 
though important element.”); see also Harry T. Edwards, The Journey from Brown v. Board of 
Education to Grutter v. Bollinger: From Racial Assimilation to Diversity, 102 MICH. L. REV. 944, 964 
(2004) (Justice Powell’s view was narrow, for he valued “racial and ethnic diversity only to the degree 
that it brought about a diversity of ‘experiences, outlooks, and ideas.’” (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 
314)). 
214. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314 (“An otherwise qualified medical student with a particular background—
whether it be ethnic, geographic, culturally advantaged or disadvantaged—may bring to a professional 
school of medicine experiences, outlooks, and ideas that enrich the training of its student body and better 
equip its graduates to render with understanding their vital service to humanity.”). 
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applicant as one aspect of the diversity mosaic.215 Race cannot be the decisive 
factor, but it may be a “plus” factor.216
It is worth emphasizing that Justice Powell watered down the independent 
significance of racial diversity—an effective and efficient way to physically 
integrate public colleges to promote racial equality—at a time when compliance 
with Brown was strongly resisted around the country.217 If white society resisted 
measures to promote racial equality at the time of Brown and shortly thereafter, it is 
not surprising that support for measures like affirmative action was weak from its 
inception.218 What is startling, however, is the Court’s recent sanctioning of Justice 
Powell’s diversity rationale in Grutter v. Bollinger.219 Grutter’s reasoning parallels 
the suggestions in this Article that integration requires a physical presence of 
different races within a school, and it also requires that all students’ racial identities 
be treated with dignity.220
3. Grutter: Diversity, Integration and Hints of Equality 
In 2003, Grutter explicitly affirmed Justice Powell’s rationale in Bakke and 
held that seeking to achieve a diverse class is a compelling state interest and, thus, 
public colleges and universities may take race into account in their admissions 
decisions.221 The case arose in the context of a white applicant who was denied 
admission to the University of Michigan Law School (Michigan) and challenged 
Michigan’s use of race in the admissions process.222 Grutter carefully explained 
that the use of race to achieve diversity can only be done in the process of a holistic 
review of each applicant’s file.223 Like Justice Powell, the Grutter majority 
emphasized that diversity is a broad concept and the many ways in which an 
applicant may contribute to a school’s diversity.224 On these points, Grutter
adopted Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke and thereby turned his watered down 
version of racial equality into established law. 
Notwithstanding the similarities, however, the majority opinion in Grutter is 
215. Id. at 317 (The file of an applicant can be “examined for his contribution to potential diversity 
without the factor of race being decisive.”). 
216. Id.
217. See, e.g., Cooper, 358 U.S. at 26 (acknowledging the existence of public hostility toward school 
desegregation post-Brown).
218. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (“We have never approved a classification that aids persons perceived as 
members of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in the absence of 
judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations.”). 
 219. 539 U.S. at 325. 
220. Id. at 330. The University of Michigan Law School’s admissions policy promotes “cross-racial 
understanding,” helping to break down racial stereotypes and enabling a better understanding among 
students of persons of different races. Said benefits are “important and laudable,” because “classroom 
discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting” when the students 
have “the greatest possible variety of backgrounds.” Id.
221. Id. at 325. 
222. Id. at 316. 
223. Id. at 334 (“[A]n admissions program must be ‘flexible enough to consider all pertinent 
elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant, and to place them on the 
same footing for consideration, although not necessarily according them the same weight.’” (quoting 
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317)). 
224. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337-38. 
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remarkably and significantly different from Justice Powell’s in at least two ways. 
First, it is sensitive to the dual nature of integration.225 With respect to physical 
integration, the Court accepted that it is constitutionally permissible for states to 
admit a “critical mass” of racial minority students.226 The concept of “critical mass” 
is not about numbers or percentages,227 although there has to be more than a 
“token” representation of a particular racial group.228 A “critical mass” of racial 
minority students is related to the concept of dignity integration.229 The Court 
noted, “[j]ust as growing up in a particular region or having particular professional 
experiences is likely to affect an individual’s views, so too is one’s own, unique 
experience of being a racial minority in a society, like our own, in which race 
unfortunately still matters.”230 The presence of a critical mass of racial minority 
students breaks down stereotypes.231
As this Article posits, the most important racial stereotype to debunk is the 
race myth. To do so, students must develop interracial relationships that expose the 
systemic power imbalance inherent in the myth. Naturally, there is no guarantee 
that integrated schools will improve race relations. But it is also true that race 
relations continue to be strained in society and that developing deeper 
understandings of race and its complexities could only help to improve them. 
Because children spend significant amounts of time in school, it is logical to focus 
the effort there. Certainly, to continue to sanction the resegregation of unequal 
schools merely reinforces the myth and further entrenches it. 
This is not to say that all members of a racial group think alike, of course, as 
the Court acknowledges.232 To mandate the presence of certain groups in a student 
body is to stereotype them based on race or other characteristics, and the Supreme 
Court rightfully eschews these stereotypes.233 Grutter itself noted that one reason 
the University of Michigan Law School wanted to admit a critical mass of minority 
students was to ensure the presence of enough minority students to debunk any 
stereotypes that might attach to them.234
Thus, Grutter emphasized that the physical presence of racial minority 
students was not the primary reason for its support of the diversity rationale.235
Rather, the Court repeatedly explained that it is the racial minority and racial 
225. Id. at 329-33 (recognizing the importance of a “critical mass”); id. at 319 (acknowledging the 
value of minority voice representation). 
226. Id. at 322-23 (“[A] ‘State has a substantial interest that legitimately may be served by a properly 
devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin.’” 
(quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320)). 
227. Id. at 319. 
228. Id. at 333. 
229. See Grutter 539 U.S. at 329 (finding a diverse student body is at the heart of the university’s 
institutional mission); id. at 333 (noting that a critical mass of minorities is necessary to secure the 
educational benefits of a diverse student body). 
230. Id. at 333. 
231. Id. at 330. 
232. Id. at 333. 
233. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 541-42 (1996) (“State actors controlling gates 
to opportunity . . . may not exclude qualified individuals based on fixed notions concerning the roles and 
abilities of males and females.”) (citation omitted). 
234. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333. 
235. Id. at 329. 
Fall 2010] DIGNITY AND EQUALITY OF CHILDREN 103
majority students interacting with each other that goes to the heart of the matter.236
Through their “robust exchange of ideas,”237 they can learn from each other how to 
mediate the color line and gain “cross-racial understanding.”238 It encourages, 
perhaps even forces, some people to cross the color line. The Court noted that 
given the “increasingly diverse workforce and society,”239 the Law School, and 
institutions of higher education more generally, have a compelling interest in 
preparing students, particularly as professionals, to work successfully in their 
multi-racial environments.240 To have students of different races interacting with 
each other, particularly in respectful ways, is the essence of an integrated class. 
Students in an integrated class teach each other what human and racial equality 
mean. They become better citizens and, according to Brown, fulfill one of the major 
purposes of education.241
Closely related to this goal, the second way in which Grutter differs from 
Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion is especially important. The Court bolsted its 
sanctioning of diversity by addressing the importance of the all-but-forgotten issue 
of racial equality242—an issue that is related to, but different from, diversity—in the 
context of education, the Court explicitly said the following: 
[T]he diffusion of knowledge and opportunity through public 
institutions of higher education must be accessible to all individuals 
regardless of race or ethnicity . . . . In order to cultivate a set of 
leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary 
that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified 
individuals of every race and ethnicity . . . . Access to legal 
education (and thus the legal profession) must be inclusive of 
talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity, so that 
all members of our heterogeneous society may participate in the 
educational institutions that provide the training and education 
necessary to succeed in America.243
This language supports the Court’s reasoning behind constitutionalizing the 
diversity rationale, but behind the need to do this is the compelling requirement that 
our society achieve racial equality. Moreover, Grutter supports this by referring to 
and relying on the principles of Sweatt244 and Brown,245 cases premised on dignity 
integration. 
236. Id. at 330. 
237. Id. at 329. 
238. Id. at 330. 
239. Id.
240. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330. 
241. Id. at 331. 
242. See id. at 331-32 (“[E]nsuring that public institutions are open and available to all segments of 
American society, including people of all races and ethnicities, represents a paramount government 
objective.”).
243. Id. at 331-33. 
244. See id. at 331 (“This Court has long recognized that ‘education . . . is the very foundation of 
good citizenship.’” (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 493)). 
245. See id. at 332 (“[L]aw schools ‘cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals and 
institutions with which the law interacts.’” (quoting Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634)). 
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Unfortunately, and detracting from the goal, Grutter does not stand for the 
proposition that state colleges and universities must administer race-conscious 
admissions procedures; it simply means they can elect that option as long as each 
applicant’s file is individually reviewed and an applicant’s race is only one factor 
among many other criteria used in the evaluation process.246 Consistent with 
Grutter, other states require race-blind admissions procedures.247
Interestingly, even states that adhere to race-blind admissions express strong 
support for racial diversity and try to achieve it in myriad other ways.248 They may 
expend significant resources recruiting at high schools attended predominantly by 
racial minorities.249 They express in the media how much they value racial diversity 
and use pictures in their brochures of racial minorities who are already enrolled to 
lure potential students to campus who also value racial diversity.250 Significantly, 
this might mean that more white students apply to and choose to attend a particular 
school, because a school that lacks racial diversity can be unattractive to equality-
minded people of all races.251 School officials know this and readily spend financial 
and personnel resources to try to attract racially diverse students.252
Because states are free under Grutter to use race-conscious or race-blind 
admissions processes, they can experiment and decide which alternative best helps 
them achieve their goal of admitting a diverse class, particularly a racially diverse 
class. Texas, ironically, adopted a race-blind process following a lawsuit that 
challenged the use of race in admissions at the University of Texas in 2000, well 
before Grutter.253 Hopwood v. Texas254 further analyzed the diversity rationale 
when the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down Texas’ race-conscious 
admissions policy.255
In 2003, however, the University of Texas Board of Regents passed a 
resolution giving university officials permission to consider race in their 
246. Grutter, 539 U.S at 334. 
 247. Michelle Locke, Race-Blind Admissions Turn 10: As Campus Notes Decade of Race-Blind 
Admissions, Affirmative Action Foe Targets Five More States, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, May 13, 2007, at 
A10 (noting that Michigan, Florida, and Texas have revised their policies in order to implement race-
blind admissions). 
248. See, e.g., Jacques Steinberg, Colleges Marketing Easy Sell to Applicants: No Fee and No Essay,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan 26, 2010, at A1 (highlighting the trend in colleges toward hiring professionals to 
implement marketing campaigns in order to increase diversity in applicant pool). 
249. See, e.g., Maurice Dyson, In Search of the Talented Tenth: Diversity, Affirmative Access, and 
University-Driven Reform, 6 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 41, 72 (2003) (noting that Texas and Florida have 
aimed their recruitment efforts at non-traditional feeder schools in predominantly minority areas). 
250. See, e.g., Lisa Lapin, Stanford Woos Minority Students, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 22, 
1987, at 1B (stating that Stanford designs brochures to look more friendly by filling them “with pictures 
of smiling Hispanic, black and American Indian students”). 
 251. Steinberg, supra note 248, at A1 (describing how the College of Saint Rose’s diversity 
marketing campaign increased enrollment of Asian, Hispanic, African American students from seven 
percent to eighteen percent, and coincided with an total increase in applications). 
252. Id.
253. See, e.g., Ron Nissimov, Hopwood Decision Stands; Colleges in State Can’t Use Race in 
Admissions Decisions, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 22, 2000, at A37 (“In its 1996 Hopwood decision, the 5th 
Circuit effectively stopped all Texas colleges and universities from using race as an admissions factor”). 
 254. 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000). 
255. Id. at 275. 
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admissions processes as long as their policies complied with Grutter.256 The 
University of Texas conducted a comprehensive study of its admissions process 
and issued a report in 2004 detailing why it was returning to a race-conscious 
policy.257 Briefly, the University found that its race-neutral policy had failed to 
enable it to admit a “critical mass of minority students sufficient to provide an 
optimal educational experience in 1996 (the pre-Hopwood period), and after seven 
years of good faith race-neutral admissions policies, the University still has not 
reached a critical mass at the classroom level.”258 The report highlighted that a non-
diverse classroom prevented the University from fulfilling its mission of producing 
tomorrow’s leaders.259 Recently, a district court upheld the new policy because it 
complied with Grutter.260
The decision by the University of Texas to return to a race-conscious 
admissions policy highlights the importance of racial diversity in education. 
Admittedly, the concept of diversity can be so broadly defined that it becomes 
meaningless. Significantly, though, it is worth remembering that the concept itself 
arose in the context of racial diversity in education at a time when racial equality 
was a primary national goal.261 “Diversity” in education, by definition, is about 
inclusion, or in the parlance of Brown and the busing cases, it is about integration 
and achieving racial equality.262 Although it is possible for a space to be 
desegregated but not integrated, it is impossible for a space to be diverse and not 
integrated—as diversity was originally understood. It would fly in the face of 
Brown and Grutter to accept a definition of diversity that lacked the critical aspect 
of racial diversity. No matter what other factors might go into the diversity pot, it 
seems axiomatic with respect to equality principles that race cannot and should not 
come out of it. Presumably, as long as a diverse education is important, then 
equality-minded people will ensure that racial diversity continues to be an essential 
variable in the diversity equation. Moreover, racial diversity is a quality that most 
public colleges and universities aspire to achieve in their communities.263
 256. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 593 (W.D. Tex. 2009); University of Texas, Office 
of Admissions, Addition of Race and Ethnicity to Admission Criteria (Dec. 2003) http://www.utexas.edu 
/student/admissions/about/notices.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2010). 
257. Proposal to Consider Race and Ethnicity in Admissions, UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, OFFICE OF 
ADMISSIONS (June 25, 2004), http://www.utexas.edu/student/admissions/about/admission_proposal.pdf.
258. Id. at 24. 
259. Id. at 24-25; Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 602 (“In short, from a racial, ethnic, and cultural 
standpoint, students at the University are currently being educated in a less-than-realistic environment 
that is not conducive to training the leaders of tomorrow. For the University to adequately prepare future 
leaders, it must include a critical mass of students from traditionally underrepresented backgrounds.”). 
260. Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 609. The plaintiffs have appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which heard 
arguments on August 3, 2010. A decision is not expected for several months. Associated Press, Appeals 
Court Hears Case Over UT Admissions, CBS 11 (Aug. 3, 2010, 2:02 PM), http://cbs11tv.com/ 
education/University.of.Texas.2.1840464.html. 
261. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, TM, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1231, 1232 (1992) (“Thurgood 
Marshall applied his formidable talents to the central constitutional, political, and moral issue of our 
history: the struggle for racial equality and justice, and against racial discrimination and segregation.”). 
262. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (“Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal . . . . We 
have now announced that such segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws.”). 
263. See, e.g., Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative 
Action, 88 GEO. L.J. 2331, 2394-95 (2000) (“[T]o the extent that legality is a factor, Bakke, which has 
not been explicitly overruled, endorsed the limited use of racial preferences. Public universities have 
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C. The Shift Away from Diversity in K-12 
Most people interested in achieving racial equality in education are beginning 
to understand and work within the parameters of Grutter. The situation at the 
University of Texas is illustrative. Building on this momentum, Parents Involved 
examined the relevance of diversity in K-12 public schools and had an opportunity 
to clarify and build on Brown’s deepest meaning—that racial equality requires 
dignity integration.264 Unfortunately, Chief Justice Robert’s plurality opinion in 
Parents Involved reflects an ongoing confusion about the meaning and importance 
of integration in public schools. His opinion shies away from Grutter and reverts to 
an understanding of integration that focuses only on having students of different 
races physically sharing the same space and minimizes the importance of even this 
concept in the quest for racial equality.265 The responsibility for this reversion lies 
not just with the Court but also with the school officials who failed to articulate 
pedagogical reasons for their “voluntary integration” plans intended to promote 
diversity in their schools.266
1. Parents Involved
a. The States’ Interests 
In Parents Involved, the Court struck down two school districts’ voluntary 
plans to achieve “racial balance” in their K-12 student populations.267 Seattle’s plan 
involved a detailed selection procedure for student assignment.268 If too many 
students chose the same school, the plan provided that the first tiebreaker would be 
sibling enrollment, and the second tiebreaker would be the student’s race.269 In 
those situations where race became relevant, a student would be admitted or denied 
depending on whether the decision met the school’s goals to achieve “racial 
balance,” which officials defined by the racial demographics of the area.270
Similarly, Jefferson County public schools in Louisville, Kentucky, tried to achieve 
relied in good faith on this precedent and, in particular, on the diversity rationale endorsed by Justice 
Powell’s opinion.”) (footnotes omitted). 
264. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 746 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion) (“In [Brown] we held 
that segregation deprived black children of equal educational opportunities regardless of whether school 
facilities and other tangible factors were equal, because government classification and separation on 
grounds of race themselves denoted inferiority. It was not the inequality of the facilities but the fact of 
legally separating children on the basis of race on which the Court relied to find a constitutional 
violation in 1954.”) (citation omitted). 
265. See id. at 734 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion) (“While we do not suggest that greater use of 
race would be preferable, the minimal impact of the districts’ racial classifications on school enrollment 
casts doubt on the necessity of using racial classifications.”). 
266. Id. at 827 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
267. Id. at 748 (Roberts, C.J, plurality opinion) (“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race 
is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”). 
268. Id. at 711-12 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion). 
269. Id. Specifically, “[i]f an oversubscribed school [was] not within 10 percentage points of the 
district’s overall white/nonwhite racial balance, it [was] what the district call[ed] ‘integration positive,’ 
and the district employ[ed] a tiebreaker that select[ed] for assignment students whose race . . . serve[d] 
to bring the school into balance.’” Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 712 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion). 
270. Id. at 712 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion). 
Fall 2010] DIGNITY AND EQUALITY OF CHILDREN 107
“racial balance” in their non-magnet schools by adopting guidelines that allowed 
officials to consider the race of students in their school assignments. Louisville 
defined “racial balance” as maintaining “a minimum black enrollment of 15 
percent, and a maximum black enrollment of 50 percent.”271 Parents of two 
students, one from Seattle and the other from Jefferson County, who were denied 
admission to their top-choice school because of race, challenged the 
constitutionality of the voluntary plans under equal protection.272
Seattle asserted that its plan was designed “to ensure that racially concentrated 
housing patterns do not prevent nonwhite students from having access to the most 
desirable schools.”273 Jefferson County asserted that it wanted its students to reap 
the intangible socialization benefits that attach to attending racially integrated 
school.274 Both districts asserted the general interest in having racially diverse 
schools and relied on Grutter to support the constitutionality of their plans.275
b. The Court’s Reasoning 
i. A Brief Synopsis of Parents Involved 
The Court ruled that the plans were unconstitutional because they were not 
narrowly tailored and, therefore, failed to pass strict scrutiny.276 Chief Justice 
Roberts, in a part of his opinion that commanded only a plurality of votes, 
suggested that a school district’s interest in using race to assign public students to 
schools in grades K-12 is not compelling.277 The plurality opinion mentioned that 
271. Id. at 716 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion). 
272. Id. at 714, 717(Roberts, C.J., majority opinion). 
273. Id. at 725 (Roberts, C.J, plurality opinion). 
274. Id.
275. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 725-26 (Roberts, C.J, plurality opinion); see Brief for Petitioner-
Appellant, Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (No. 05-
908), 2006 WL 3381292, at *7, *8, *12 (arguing that the Seattle school district’s plan violates Grutter
because school enrollment is diverse without racial preference, racial balance cannot be a compelling 
government interest, and the district’s race preference is not narrowly tailored). But see Brief for 
Respondent-Appellee, Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (No. 
05-915), 2006 WL 2944684, at *15 (arguing that Jefferson County’s plan satisfies Grutter when 
modified for the elementary and secondary school context because its flexibility and limited use of race, 
among other factors, are narrowly tailored to the compelling government interest of a competitive 
educational system). 
276. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 735 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion). 
277. Id. at 729-32 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion). The majority addresses the states’ asserted 
interests in achieving diversity, but distinguishes the use of diversity in higher education from its use in 
K-12 schools. Id. at 722-25 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion). The principal difference, according to the 
Court, is that diversity was held to be a compelling state interest in Grutter because applicants could be 
given individualized evaluation of their entire record as part of the admissions process. Id. In K-12 
education, there is no admissions process that would enable such individualized review. Id. Instead, a 
student’s race, when it was relevant in Parents Involved, became determinative. Id. at 723 (Roberts, C.J., 
majority opinion). Importantly, however, Justice Kennedy and the four dissenters considered diversity at 
the K-12 level is a compelling state interest. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 783 (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 865 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer’s opinion is 
worth emphasizing on this point. He opined, “[j]ust as diversity in higher education was deemed 
compelling in Grutter, diversity in public primary and secondary schools—where there is even more to 
gain—must be, a fortiori, a compelling state interest.” Id. at 865 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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the Court has previously found only two interests that satisfy strict scrutiny in the 
area of racial equality—remedying past discrimination and achieving diversity in 
higher education—neither of which was involved in this case.278 Justice Thomas 
concurred separately on this point, calling attempts to integrate the schools part of a 
“faddish social theor[y].”279 Justice Kennedy joined the opinion but concurred 
separately to state that he believed that race can be considered in some 
circumstances, like deciding where to build new schools, for the purpose of 
achieving integration.280 The four dissenters, Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Stevens, 
and Souter, would have upheld the plans and believed strongly that prior cases, 
particularly Brown, supported the constitutionality of factoring race into student 
assignment plans.281 Behind this description of the justices’ views about the use of 
race in school assignments are many pages of contentious debate among them 
about the true meaning or continuing vitality of Brown.282
ii. A Clear Message: Rejecting the “Black/White” Paradigm
In light of the goal to achieve racial equality, Parents Involved did move one 
step forward. Specifically, the Court questioned the legitimacy of both districts’ 
plans because their racial classifications were binary.283 Seattle categorized students 
as either white or nonwhite,284 and Louisville categorized them as black or 
“other.”285 The Court, quite understandably, was puzzled by this narrow conception 
of race. It pointed out that some schools had significant percentages of whites, 
Asians, and Latinos but they were not considered racially diverse.286 Even if one 
takes the position that discrimination against blacks is an especially acute problem 
because of the history of slavery, one must still admit that racial diversity is far 
more complex than a binary conception allows. To achieve racial equality for 
everyone, modern plans must factor in the complexities inherent in racial identities 
278. Id. at 720-22 (Roberts, C.J, majority opinion). 
279. Id. at 780 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
280. Id. at 788-89 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
281. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 864 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
282. See id. at 746-48 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion) (“What do the racial classifications at issue 
here do, if not accord differential treatment on the basis of race?”); see id. at 798-803 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“[The 1968 Supreme Court] was more faithful to Brown and more respectful of our 
precedent than it is today. It is my firm conviction that no Member of the Court that I joined in 1975 
would have agreed with today’s decision.”); see also id. at 842-43 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[I]t was 
Brown, after all, focusing upon primary and secondary schools, not Sweatt v. Painter, focusing on law 
schools, or McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Ed., focusing on graduate schools, that 
affected so deeply not only Americans but the world.”) (citations omitted). 
283. Id. at 723, 735 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion). Professor Liu agrees that considering race in 
binary terms “is not a trivial concern.” Liu, supra note 7, at 287. However, Professor Liu also notes that 
“[t]he largest component of racial segregation in large central-city school districts is white/nonwhite 
segregation, and Seattle is no exception.” Id. (footnote omitted). In the context of Seattle, the 
white/nonwhite distinction therefore made sense. 
284. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 723 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion). 
285. Id.
286. Id. at 724 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion) (“But under the Seattle plan, a school with fifty 
percent Asian-American students and fifty percent white students but no African-American, Native-
American, or Latino students would qualify as balanced, while a school with thirty percent Asian-
American, twenty-five percent African-American, twenty-five percent Latino, and twenty percent white 
students would not.”). 
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and acknowledge that diversity, particularly racial diversity, cannot be achieved by 
focusing only on the black or nonwhite/white paradigm.287 Indeed, the paradigm 
must be rejected to achieve racial equality.
iii. A Confusing Message: The Importance of Physical Integration
Chief Justice Roberts emphasized throughout his plurality opinion that both 
Seattle’s and Louisville’s plans were designed to achieve racial balancing and 
nothing more.288 Citing Grutter, the Court repeated that “‘outright racial balancing’ 
is ‘patently unconstitutional.’”289 The Court confidently asserted this observation as 
if it were simple and clear, but it actually is quite confusing. It raises questions 
about Brown’s meaning, which likely was a major reason Justice Kennedy joined 
only parts of the opinion.290 After all, as Justice Kennedy and the dissenters 
highlighted, racial balancing is related to integration and integration is related to 
equality.291 Thus, to say that racial balancing for its own sake is unconstitutional 
implies that there is no relationship between racial balancing and racial equality. 
Realistically, it would be helpful to move away from this categorical conclusion, 
which is misleading and unhelpful, and try to further articulate what that 
relationship is. 
School officials who try to achieve “racial balance” in their schools 
undoubtedly are influenced by Brown’s integration mandate. Even if one accepts 
that “racial balancing for its own sake” is unconstitutional, how many schools 
really try to achieve racial balance just for the fun it or just because they like the 
idea? In reality, assuming officials act in the best interest of their students, they try 
to achieve some racial balance (mixture, integration, diversity) in their schools 
because they believe that their schools are “better” as a result. 
This attempt at creating racial balance is where Brown started when it ended 
de jure segregation in schools and is what the country worked so hard to achieve 
through school integration efforts well into the 1990s. “Racial balance” suggests 
there is or should be a quantitative element to the qualitative value of integration. 
This suggestion relates to what integration means in the context of Gaines, Sweatt,
and McLaurin.292 It also is related to the “critical mass” concept that educators in 
 287. For the limitations of such a focus, see Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of 
Race: The “Normal Science” of American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213 (1997). A binary 
(black/white) paradigm of race “operates to exclude Latinos/as from full membership and participation 
in racial discourse,” and this “exclusion serves to perpetuate not only the paradigm itself but also 
negative stereotypes of Latinos/as.” Id. at 1215. 
288. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 711 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion) (framing the underlying 
legal question as whether public schools “may choose to classify” students based on race and rely upon 
said classification in assigning schools); id. at 720 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion) (applying strict 
scrutiny because of individual race-based benefit from government). 
289. Id. at 730 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion) (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330). 
290. Id. at 787-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
291. See id. at 797-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“This Nation 
has a moral and ethical obligation to fulfill its historical commitment to creating an integrated society 
that ensures equal opportunity for all of its children.”); id. at 864 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he law has 
consistently and unequivocally approved of both voluntary and compulsory race-conscious measures to 
combat segregated schools . . . . [T]he fate of race relations in this country depends upon unity among 
our children . . . .”). 
292. See discussion supra Part I.B.1 (pointing out the differences between integration and the policy 
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Grutter held out as their standard to measure when they had achieved diversity.293
Trying to attain some level of “racial balancing,” then, should not be so easily 
scorned and condemned. 
Rightfully, the Court looked for some qualitative link to the racial balancing 
goals of Seattle and Louisville.294 What, if anything, could make racial balancing 
constitutional? The Court strictly scrutinized the plans and struck them down 
because it was unpersuaded the plans were necessary to achieve established 
compelling state interests in this area.295 Specifically, the Court reaffirmed that only 
two state interests meet strict scrutiny with respect to the use of race: remedying the 
effects of past intentional racial discrimination296 and promoting diversity in higher 
education.297
The Court quickly dismissed the application of the first interest because 
Seattle schools had never been segregated by law.298 While Louisville schools had 
been segregated, they had achieved unitary status pursuant to a court order 
dissolved in 2000.299 The implications of this are confusing. Even if Seattle schools 
were never segregated, that does not mean that the district has no interest in having 
racially integrated schools. Racially integrated schools are essential to achieve 
racial equality. The fact that Louisville schools were segregated by law is clearly 
relevant to the issue of racial equality, especially given that they achieved unitary 
status only a few years before the lawsuit in Parents Involved started.300 The 
Court’s emphatic insistence that racial balancing for its own sake is 
unconstitutional fails to acknowledge that even if the cities were trying to achieve 
some measure of integration for its own sake, there is a relationship between that 
and racial equality. 
Naturally, the Seattle and Louisville plans were not implemented only to 
achieve racial balance in the schools. The officials were trying to overcome 
tremendous racial inequality in their school system, characterized by “pain, 
inhumanity, and social degradation.”301 But the Court held that the schools failed to 
articulate what they were really trying to achieve.302 This is why the Court 
of de-segregation) 
293. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319. 
294. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion). 
295. Id. at 732 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion). 
296. Id. at 720 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion). 
297. Id. at 722 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion). 
298. Id. at 721 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion) (“Yet the Seattle public schools have not shown that 
they were ever segregated by law, and were not subject to the court-ordered desegregation decrees.”). 
299. Id. at 720 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion) (“In 2000 the District Court that entered that decree 
dissolved it, finding that Jefferson County had ‘eliminated the vestiges associated with the former policy 
of segregation and its pernicious effects,’ and thus had achieved ‘unitary’ status.” (citing Hampton v. 
Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 360 (W.D. Ky. 1999))). 
300. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion) (noting that the 
desegregation decree was dissolved in 2000 and the case was argued in 2006). 
301. See Liu, supra note 7, at 306 (“A full telling of that story would begin by describing the pain, 
inhumanity, and social degradation caused by state imposed school segregation. It would describe the 
individual potential which segregation suppressed; the spirit and determination of those who overcame 
the obstacles it imposed; and the moral strength of those who fought the legal, social, and political battle 
against it and other forms of discrimination.” (citing Hampton v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 72 F. 
Supp. 2d 753, 755 (W.D. Ky. 1999))). 
302. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 726-27 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion) (indicating that the 
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dismissed their second alleged interest in diversity.303 The schools’ purported 
interests in achieving diversity were neither well-articulated nor well-implemented; 
their goals simply mirrored the demographics of the areas.304 The schools did not 
show why or how their plans provided educational benefits.305 Fatally, they also 
focused only on achieving racial diversity, not the broad-based diversity upheld in 
Grutter.306 Parents Involved also added that the reasoning of Grutter is particular to 
the unique context of higher education where the exchange of ideas and First 
Amendment values play a special role.307 Accordingly, a majority of the Court 
concluded that “[t]he present cases are not governed by Grutter.”308
What about the constitutionality of the states’ asserted interests in the 
“intangible socialization benefits” that are achieved in a racially integrated 
environment? Would that interest pass strict scrutiny? Unfortunately and 
disappointingly, the Court does not evaluate whether this interest would pass strict 
scrutiny because the officials failed to tie this goal to their plans. Their plans were 
rigidly tied to mirroring the districts’ racial demographics and not to anything 
pedagogical.309 In other words, the Court was able to bypass a constitutional 
analysis of the most critical issue in the entire case because the plans were not 
narrowly tailored to do anything but achieve racial balance within a narrow 
black/white paradigm.310
iv. The Missing Message: The Importance of Dignity Integration 
Many equality-minded people wonder what happened between Grutter and 
Parents Involved. Are these cases reconcilable? The answer is both “yes” and “no.” 
Here it is helpful to step back and ask why the schools even cared about racial 
integration? Were the schools trying to remedy a problem—a “backward-looking 
justification”?311 Or were they trying to enhance the education environment—a 
“forward-looking justification”?312 Chief Justice Roberts, in his plurality opinion, 
suggested that the schools’ plans were backward and not forward-looking; for the 
plurality, this difference was the constitutional difference.313
It is misleading, however, to phrase the problem of racial inequality in 
education as either “backward” or “forward-looking” because the persistence of 
racially identifiable and unequal schools is the result of a history of discrimination 




306. See id. at 729 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion) (calling the effort to achieve diversity “solely by 
reference to the demographics of the respective school districts . . . . a fatal flaw”). 
307. Id. at 724 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion). 
308. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 725 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion). 
309. See id. at 726 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion) (“The plans are tied to each district’s specific 
racial demographics, rather than to any pedagogic concept of the level of diversity needed to obtain the 
asserted educational benefits.”). 
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that was never remedied.314 This reality notwithstanding, Chief Justice Roberts 
emphasized in his plurality opinion, “[t]his working backward to achieve a 
particular type of racial balance, rather than looking forward from some 
demonstration of the level of diversity that provides the purported benefits, is a 
fatal flaw under our existing precedent.”315
(a) The Backward-looking Justification 
Assuming school officials adopted their plans because they were trying to fix 
a problem, what was that problem? Admittedly, the problem was not de jure 
segregation, nor was the problem trying to remedy the effects of past de jure 
segregation. 316 The Court highlighted that Seattle had never been segregated by 
law and that Louisville had complied with the court order to attain unitary status.317
Try as it might, the Court could not find a constitutional problem with respect to 
the racial composition of the schools, and therefore could not find the plans were 
constitutionally necessary to solve a racial inequality problem.318
The Court’s focus suggests that it interpreted the harm in Brown to be only de
jure segregation and perhaps its immediate aftermath. Chief Justice Roberts 
dramatically ended his plurality opinion by stating that Brown held that race cannot 
be considered in student assignments and concluded that “[t]he way to stop 
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”319
This focus and reasoning inspired criticism from Justices Stevens320 and Breyer321
that the Chief Justice’s opinion changes the fundamental meaning of Brown.
Chief Justice Roberts Parents Involved plurality opinion boiled down to this: 
the officials were trying to achieve racial balance that simply mirrored the area’s 
demographics.322 Racial imbalance in itself is not unconstitutional and “‘outright 
racial balancing’ is ‘patently unconstitutional.’”323 Accordingly, the Court held that 
trying to balance the imbalance by using a student’s race to make an assignment 
314. See Spann, supra note 8, at 452-53 (“T[he Parents Involved majority’s] insistence on 
prospective colorblind race neutrality has both the intent and the effect of protecting the existing 
allocation of societal resources from remedial attempts at redistribution. Moreover, they intend this 
result even though they know that the existing distribution of societal resources remains highly tainted 
by the continuing effects of past discrimination.”) Again, one should be reminded of Justice Harlan’s 
dissent in Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
315. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 729 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion). 
316. Id. at 720-21 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion) (citing Hampton, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 360). 
317. Id.
318. See id. at 720 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion) (“We have emphasized that the harm being 
remedied by mandatory desegregation plans is the harm that is traceable to segregation, and that ‘the 
Constitution is not violated by racial imbalance in the schools, without more.’” (quoting Milliken, 433 
U.S. at 280 n.14)). 
319. Id. at 748 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion). 
320. Id. at 798-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“There is a cruel irony in The Chief Justice’s reliance on 
our decision in Brown . . . .”). 
321. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 803-04 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The plurality pays inadequate 
attention to this law . . . . [I]t reverses course and reaches the wrong conclusion. In doing so, it distorts 
precedent . . . and it undermines Brown’s promise of integrated primary and secondary education that 
local communities have sought to make a reality.”). 
322. Id. at 726-27 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion). 
323. Id. at 730 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330). 
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could not be a constitutional remedy.324 The Court failed to see or to acknowledge 
the connection between racially imbalanced schools and unequal educational 
opportunities, and how racial balancing can be yet another way to achieve dignity 
integration, which is essential to equality.325
(b) The Forward-looking Justification 
Without a problem to solve, the only other way to justify the plans, according 
to the Court, was to fit them into the context of Grutter’s diversity rationale. 
Instead of trying to remedy a problem, then, the plans could have been defended by 
showing they were designed to provide pedagogical benefits that attach to diverse 
classrooms.326 Again, this was an asserted interest of both districts, but only in 
vague terms that failed to meet strict scrutiny standards because they were not 
narrowly tailored to meet the goal.327
A critical point needs to be interjected. We must reject any hint that 
integration enhances the capacity of children of color to succeed academically. This 
might be one reason why many people, including Justice Thomas, vehemently 
objected to “integration plans” because any suggestion that children of color need 
to attend schools with white children in order to succeed is insulting.328 He wrote, 
“[i]n reality, it is far from apparent that coerced racial mixing has any educational 
benefits, much less that integration is necessary to black achievement.”329 While 
integration initially served the purpose of racial mixing, it also served the purpose 
of equalizing the economic resources that became available to the students of color 
who were bused to the white and generally more resource-rich schools. Today, 
dignity integration more accurately describes why integration is inextricably tied to 
racial equality. It is perhaps the only way to invalidate the race myth, and, in 
particular, the part of the myth that promotes white superiority. Dignity integration 
benefits all students. 
(c) A Little Bit of Both: Backward- and Forward-Looking 
[Justice Robert’s opinion] suppose[s] that past discrimination has no 
present day effects and that racial stereotypes, bias, and embedded 
inequalities do not infect our social institutions.330
—Professor Charles Ogletree and Susan Eaton 
324. See id. at 747 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion) (“What do the racial classifications do in these 
cases, if not determine admission to a public school on a racial basis?”). 
325. See id. at 843 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asserting that racially balanced schools create more 
effective pedagogical environments and provide better educational opportunities to students as a result). 
326. Id. at 726 (plurality opinion) (“The plans are tied to each district’s specific racial demographics, 
rather than to any pedagogic concept of the level of diversity needed to obtain the asserted educational 
benefits.”). 
327. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 726 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion) (“[I]t is clear that the 
racial classifications employed by the districts [in Parents Involved] are not narrowly tailored to the goal 
of achieving the educational and social benefits asserted to flow from racial diversity.”). 
328. Id. at 761 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
329. Id.
 330. Ogletree & Eaton, supra note 104, at 287-88. 
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School officials who try to achieve “racial balance” or “integration” in their 
schools should never assert that physical integration is the constitutional end. It is 
not. It is time to recognize that integration in the context of education is 
inextricably tied to dignity integration.331 In Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy 
generally understood this, although the four dissenters understood it better. 
Specifically, Justice Kennedy invoked Brown to suggest that race can be 
considered sometimes for the purpose of achieving Brown’s objective of equal 
educational opportunity.332 He also attacked the whole race myth, not just the myth 
of black inferiority. Justice Kennedy subsequently opined that “[t]he Nation’s 
schools strive to teach that our strength comes from people of different races, 
creeds, and cultures uniting in commitment to the freedom of all,”333 then further 
stating, “[t]his Nation has a moral and ethical obligation to fulfill its historic 
commitment to creating an integrated society that ensures equal opportunity for all
of its children.”334
So how did Justice Kennedy, with all due respect, miss the proverbial boat? 
One possible explanation comes from Professor Kevin Brown’s analysis of Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion in Parents Involved. Justice Kennedy’s vote with the majority 
to strike down the voluntary integration plans was rooted in his belief, based on 
experience, that classifying individuals on the basis of race is constitutionally 
impermissible.335 Again, drawing on experience, such a practice violates the 
individual’s dignity, but the use of race-conscious measures that do not focus on 
individuals does not harm an individual. Based on his experiences as a black man, 
Professor Brown justifiably asserts that Justice Kennedy’s distinction is 
“irrational”336 but “has merit.”337 Professor Brown explains: 
The principal concern of underrepresented minorities—including 
me—is not being treated as members of a racial or ethnic minority, 
but being treated in a negative manner because we are racial or 
ethnic minorities. It is not the denialof individuality that is the harm; 
it is the fact that some person, some institution, or some institutional 
practice has affirmatively disadvantaged us because we are 
minorities. However, regardless of my experience as a black person
dealing with my race, my experience of interacting with and 
observing the experiences of so many white people dealing with their 
 331. Ironically, even if the Court had upheld the plans in Parents Involved, dignity integration still 
would have been missing because the plans sanctioned intra-school segregation in student placements. 
For an excellent analysis and critique of this aspect of the Seattle situation, see Nelson, supra note 17, at 
607-10 (describing a case study provided by author where an extraordinarily diverse school in Seattle 
still fails to afford minority students with the equal educational opportunities that for full-scale dignity 
integration).
332. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
333. Id. at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added). 
334. Id. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added). 
 335. Kevin Brown, Reflections on Justice Kennedy’s Opinion in Parents Involved: Why Fifty Years of 
Experience Shows Kennedy Is Right, 59 S.C. L. REV. 735, 744-45 (2008). 
336. Id. at 747. 
337. Id.
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race has clearly attuned me to the reality that many whites are not 
accustomed to thinking of themselves as members of a racial group. 
Many whites are much more likely to find the fact they are treated as 
a white person, as opposed to an individual, demeaning. Thus, my 
experience of being a black person tells me that it is negative 
treatment accorded to me because I am black that is the harm. My 
experience also is that so many white people react to the denial of 
their individuality when they are treated as being white as a harm in 
and of itself. The distinction Justice Kennedy draws is irrational and 
illogical when comprehended against my experience of being a black 
person. However, my experience of observing and interacting with 
so many whites when they are being treated as a member of a racial 
group tells me that Kennedy’s distinction has merit.338
Reading and reflecting on Professor Brown’s observations and insights into Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence reminds me of Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy. Even as 
Justice Harlan “got it,” he arguably did not. 
In contrast, Justice Stevens related that the Chief Justice’s reliance on Brown 
to strike down the plans was a “cruel irony,”339 and he accused the Chief Justice of 
“rewrit[ing] the history of one of this Court’s most important decisions.”340 Finally, 
Justice Breyer’s dissent asserted that “[a]ll of those plans represent local efforts to 
bring about the kind of racially integrated education that Brown . . . long ago 
promised.”341 Furthermore, the dissent lamented that “[t]he plurality’s position . . . 
would break that promise.”342 Still, the dissenting Justices and Justice Kennedy 
supported the proposition that dignity integration is at the heart of Brown. On this 
point, the plurality missed a giant-leap opportunity and further weakened the link 
between Brown and racial equality. 
2. The Relevance of Diversity in K-12 
Unfortunately, given that Parents Involved held that the Constitution all but 
prohibits voluntary integration plans in public schools,343 it comes as no surprise 
that the Court created tremendous confusion with respect to the relationship 
between integration and diversity and the relevance, if any, of diversity in grades 
K-12. The Court’s rejection of the need to integrate de facto segregated schools and 
its obfuscation of the importance of diversity in K-12344 are a double blow to 
338. Id.
339. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 798-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
340. Id. at 799 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
341. Id. at 803 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
342. Id. at 868 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
343. Id. at 721-23 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion). Justice Kennedy does, however, leave open the 
possibility that race can be considered in some circumstances. For example, he opines that it would be 
constitutional to consider race in deciding where to build new schools. Id. at 789 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
344. Parents Involved, 55 U.S. at 787-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (arguing that integrating schools and providing equal opportunities regardless of race is a 
compelling government interest in and of itself); see also id. at 770-71 (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(limiting the importance of diversity to higher education, namely because it requires the free exchange 
of ideas in order to achieve an educational goal that is not present at the secondary level). 
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Brown. The Grutter Court understood the vital importance of diversity at the higher 
education levels, but the Parents Involved Court failed to see the relevance of 
diversity and its relationship to integration at the lower school levels. The links of 
the chain need to be connected to achieve racial equality. 
Toward this end, it is helpful to return to Plessy. The persistence of the myth is 
at least partially attributable to the adoption of a philosophy that espouses color-
blindness. Justice Harlan is credited with introducing this philosophy into society, 
when he bravely dissented in the odious Plessy case and opined that we are a color-
blind society.345 Recall, however, that he also opined that whites will always be the 
dominant race as long as they hold fast to “principles of constitutional liberty.”346
One will never know with certainty exactly what Justice Harlan meant. 
Because Justice Harlan was an equality-minded person, it is difficult to imagine 
that he believed that people of color were inherently inferior to whites and that 
whites would always be the dominant race. In this possible interpretation of his 
opinion, Justice Harlan supported the race myth and even suggested it is an integral 
part of constitutional liberty. On the other hand, he might have been suggesting that 
blacks, although not inherently inferior, would never be equal to whites because the 
racial divide is so large that it can never be bridged. Even this more ostensibly 
benign interpretation of his opinion reflects the race myth because it suggests that 
whites can just hold onto their privileged status and that they have no obligation to 
even try to achieve racial equality. It is critical that this interpretation of Justice 
Harlan’s opinion is built explicitly on white superiority and therefore implicitly on 
black inferiority. This is the race myth.  
Moreover, it bears emphasizing, that Justice Harlan dissented in Plessy, and it 
is all too easy to think that just because he dissented and announced “our 
Constitution is color-blind,”347 that he rejected the majority’s validation of the 
myth. He arguably did not. Similarly, Justice Kennedy departed company with the 
plurality in Parents Involved to distinguish his opinion about the legitimacy of 
using race—at least sometimes—to achieve Brown’s promise.348 But ultimately, he 
failed to uphold very modest voluntary integration plans that did not even violate 
his own concerns about using race; the student assignments could not have 
assaulted the individual dignity of the students involved in the cases because 
students were not assigned to schools based on any merit.349 On reflection, there is 
no reason to be color-blind unless one is trying to mask one’s negative feelings 
345. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (declaring there is no superior or 
dominant class of citizens in the eyes of the law and the Constitution). 
346. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). I explore this in more depth in my previous work. Sharon E. 
Rush, Emotional Segregation: Huckleberry Finn in the Modern Classroom, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
305, 313-15 (2003); see discussion supra Part II.A.2 (analyzing Justice Harlan’s Plessy dissent, in which 
he espouses both colorblindness and inherent white superiority.) 
347. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
348. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 795-96 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (“Notwithstanding these concerns, allocation of benefits and burdens through individual 
racial classifications was found sometimes permissible in the context of remedies for de jure wrong.”) 
(emphasis added). 
349. See Brown, supra note 335, at 753 (“Justice Kennedy allows public school authorities to 
produce as much integration as they can, without unduly upsetting the sensibilities of white students, 
white parents, and white voters.”); see also Liu, supra note 7 at 313 (“But the history of the Seattle plan 
is a story of increasingly modest uses of race.”). 
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about race. Such negative feelings are rooted in the myth.  
Significantly, equality-minded individuals who value diversity in education 
understand, at least on some level of consciousness, the ways in which color-
blindness conflicts with the goal mentioned above. A critical component of 
diversity is racial diversity for all of the reasons explored in this Article. In reality, 
to espouse a color-blind philosophy and also try to achieve diversity in education is 
confusing and even oxymoronic. Diversity is not color-blind. 
Thus, many adults with the best of intentions, often subconsciously believe the 
race myth and teach their children to believe the same. If they better understood 
how racial dynamics function, then presumably they would work to denounce it 
and eliminate it. As Professor Liu highlights: 
[T]he socialization goals of school integration go beyond cultivating 
harmony in interpersonal relations. A critical part of what it means to 
be educated for citizenship in a multiracial society is to understand 
racial dynamics as a social not merely interpersonal phenomenon, 
shaped not only by individual attitudes and prejudices but also be the 
demographic structure of the surrounding community.350
The endeavor to invalidate the race myth is not only critically important in the 
classroom, but it is most likely to be achieved in such a setting. 
Both Grutter and Parents Involved are correct to find that diversity is 
important in education. Grutter, of course, involved a law school. But Parents 
Involved specifically limited Grutter’s diversity rationale to institutions of higher 
education, suggesting it has no relevance in grades K-12.351 This is grossly 
misguided. Research studies show that children are conscious of racial differences, 
and aware of the race myth, beginning at extremely young ages.352
Imagine a nursery school room in which the following exchange takes place: 
Aaron (4, white) taunts Amy (4, Black/white). She is alone, playing 
quietly near the gazebo. He approaches her and sticks his tongue out, 
informing her, “You can’t celebrate Kwanzaa, you’re not Black.” 
Amy retorts, “Oh yes I am. You don’t know. You’re stupid.” “I’m 
not,” he replies, sniffing at her and adding, “and you’re not Black.” 
“I am too Black!” Amy responds hotly. “My Dad is Black and so is 
his parents, my granddad and grandma.” “Stupid!” he shouts at her. 
“You’re stupid!” she yells right back. “You don’t know nothing 
about me.” She rises and faces Aaron with an angry glare on her 
face. Aaron responds in kind, and they glare at each other until he 
 350. Liu, supra note 7, at 289. 
351. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 724-25 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion) (reiterating not only 
the importance of maintaining diversity specifically in the university environment, but also subsequent 
limitations that were placed on race-based assignment plans in primary and secondary schools). 
352. See DEBRA VAN AUSDALE & JOE R. FEAGIN, THE FIRST R: HOW CHILDREN LEARN RACE AND 
RACISM 1-2 (2001) (illustrating that children gain knowledge regarding certain racial epithets after being 
exposed to certain everyday sources of sociological information, and that while children may not 
completely comprehend certain terms or their context, many demonstrate a base understanding of the 
same at a very young age). 
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finally backs down and leaves. Amy resumes her play.353
Clearly, both Aaron and Amy are quite aware of their racial differences. Moreover, 
Aaron is very comfortable telling Amy that she really is not black and therefore 
cannot legitimately celebrate Kwanzaa. This is the “white superiority” myth being 
played out in nursery school. 
How ridiculous would it be to wait until Aaron and Amy are in college before 
society and the law take steps to ensure that Aaron and Amy have diverse 
classrooms so they can gain greater cross-racial understanding? If young children 
are not taught to respect the dignity of all people, then by the time they become 
adults, they will have lived for over twenty years believing, perhaps 
subconsciously, in the validity of the race myth. By then, it is almost impossible for 
an equality-minded white person to see himself or herself as harboring 
subconscious racist beliefs because it is so out of character that it makes many 
whites angry at the suggestion. From the perspective of an equality-minded white 
person, only “real” racists—self-identified white supremacists, Ku Klux Klan 
members, and people who use the “n-word”—believe in the validity of the race 
myth. Because they do not fit those definitions, they are not “racist.” 
In a society committed to racial equality, perhaps the real question is why, in 
the twenty-first century, does the Supreme Court have to decide issues like those 
raised in Grutter and Parents Involved? How do the Aarons and Amys get to the 
college and professional school levels without cross-racial understanding and 
respect? Is it because they have never met? What have they been learning about 
racial differences in grades K-12? How much sense does it make, in a society 
committed to the democratic ideal of racial equality, to maintain de facto 
segregated schools when its history of racial segregation and economic inequality is 
premised on the myth? It is far more logical to create diverse classrooms in K-12 so 
that by the time children reach college, the real purpose behind diversity is more 
likely to be achieved. And what is that real purpose? It is to fulfill Brown’s
promise, as reinforced by Grutter, to achieve racial equality, which necessarily 
means eliminating the race myth and enabling all public spaces to be shared equally 
by people of all different races. 
CONCLUSION
Naturally, at the time of Brown, if the Court had chosen to remedy only de
jure segregation and had not required that schools be integrated, the schools 
probably would have remained racially identifiable because the race myth still 
defined white society’s view of what race relations should be. White society 
segregated the schools on purpose. Parts of white society forcefully resisted the 
integration of public schools. Realistically, after centuries of segregation and the 
treatment of blacks as less than human, announcing an end to de jure segregation 
353. Id. at 71. See Rush, Sharing Space: Why Racial Goodwill Isn’t Enough, supra note 35 
(discussing white society’s denial of racism). See also, SHARON E. RUSH, LOVING ACROSS THE COLOR 
LINE: AN ADOPTIVE MOTHER LEARNS ABOUT RACE (2000). In my book, I share many of the struggles 
and lessons I have had to learn about race and acknowledge that my experience loving across the color 
line has enabled me to learn about racial dynamics in much more informative ways. 
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was not going to do much for racial equality as a practical matter. On some level, 
the Court understood that unless schools were integrated, children of different races 
would remain isolated from each other and there would be little hope that future 
generations would learn that the race myth is invalid. Without learning that lesson, 
racial equality would remain elusive. 
Brown and its progeny, including Parents Involved, were correct to emphasize 
that outlawing de jure segregation was an essential first step in the quest to 
eliminate the race myth. Moreover, integrating the schools also is a logical and 
essential step in the same direction, because the physical presence of students of 
color in schools attended only or predominantly by white students further evidences 
a rejection of the race myth. Similarly, although this is not what Brown addressed, 
the presence of white students in schools attended only or predominantly by 
students of color also debunks the race myth. 
Notwithstanding Brown’s insightful observations, Parents Involved is a stark 
reminder of how Brown’s equality journey has stopped abysmally short of its goal. 
As de facto segregation settles in as an acceptable reality by much of society, 
including by many Supreme Court justices, it is that much easier to neglect 
Brown’s deeper meaning: to remove the race myth from schools. Parents Involved 
is tragic, not just because of its surrender to de facto segregation, but because of its 
rejection of the importance and relevance of diversity integration in its fullest 
sense, in grades K-12. 
[72]
